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I. INTRODUCTION  
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks—in addition to a catastrophic 
loss of human life—the U.S. civil aeronautical industry suffered an unprecedented 
disruption of air service to the National Aeronautical Domain (NAD), and the nation’s 
economy was projected to lose an estimated half a trillion dollars by the end of 2003 as a 
proximate result of these tragedies (Looney, 2002, p. 1). As evidenced by these terrorist 
actions, then, ensuring the adequate defense of the NAD is vital to the physical, 
psychological and economic security interests of the United States. However, some nine 
years after the 9/11 attacks—and despite the passage of federal legislation, the creation of 
a U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the appropriation of billions of dollars for 
this nation’s security—the NAD is still vulnerable to exploitation and attack.   
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT—BACKGROUND 
As far back as 1990, The 1989 President’s Commission on Aviation Security and 
Terrorism (Commission) noted the federal government’s fundamental failure to gather 
and disseminate threat assessment information1 to local aviation security partners (White 
House, 1990). In fact, some seven years later, The 1996 President’s Commission on 
Aviation Safety and Security again acknowledged that threat assessment information is 
often passed by the Central Intelligence Agency or Federal Bureau of Investigation to the 
Federal Aviation Administration (now the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 
Transportation Security Administration), but it is then “sanitized” to avoid revealing 
source information (White House, 1997). As a result of this practice, and with no formal 
                                                 
1 This thesis will recognize a distinction between the terms “intelligence information” and “threat 
assessment information,” the latter of which is typically a derivative of raw intelligence information. For 
example, the details of specific intelligence information may or may not be disseminated due to either 
classification issues or the fact that operational security for an active case investigation may necessitate 
restricting the widespread dissemination of the same, such as to protect the confidentiality of either the 
identity of a human source or the specific method by which information was collected. Threat assessment 
information, however, evolves from specific intelligence information, inclusive of that developed from the 
confidential sources cited above, and is oftentimes more generally focused on the potential threat streams 
and modalities from which a hazard may emanate in any given mission space. 
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access to any other agency within the U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC),2 local 
aviation security managers are oftentimes just told what countermeasures to implement 
by the TSA but not why they are expending the time, money and scarce resources. 
Consequently, without specific information and collaboration, local aviation security 
groups are effectively denied a meaningful opportunity to help formulate more effective 
countermeasures to threats directed toward the NAD. This culture has not significantly 
changed within the USIC over the past two decades, despite the events of 9/11. In 
addition, more recently, this supposition is further supported by the Office of the Director 
of National Intelligence’s (ODNI) 2008 report entitled, United States Intelligence 
Community Information Sharing Strategy (pp. 3, 5). 
Accordingly, while the collection, analysis and integration of threat information 
may be occurring at the DHS-Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 
headquarters’ level, empirical evidence indicates that the dissemination of the same is 
still neither consistent nor timely at the regional level throughout the NAD.3 Finally, in 
resolving the critical problems of information sharing and the subsequent implementation 
of effective countermeasures within the air domain, no substantive efforts have been 
made to adapt methodologies, such as intelligence-led policing or other similar 
organizational models, into the NAD.    
The problem of securing the NAD is further exacerbated by the fact that, as a 
critical subsector of the Transportation Industry identified within Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive -7 (HSPD-7), there is currently no standard methodology for local 
                                                 
2 According to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the U.S. Intelligence Community is 
composed of 16 federal agencies, specifically the: Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence 
Agency, Department of Energy, Department of Homeland Security, Department of State, Department of 
Treasury, Drug Enforcement Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Geospatial Intelligence 
Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, National Security Agency, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army, U.S. 
Coast Guard, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Navy (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2010).    
3 This supposition is predicated upon this researcher’s experience as a consumer, as well as the 
recurring complaints of many other major U.S. airport operators; it is not suggesting any willful 
malfeasance, but rather is identifying a significant homeland security policy issue that needs to be 
addressed if a true federal, state and local partnership is to exist in the defense of the NAD. In fact, in 
further support of this hypothesis, this researcher completed a survey related to this matter using 20 of the 
busiest U.S. airports as a sample population. The results of this survey, which was conducted in August 
2009 in the course and scope of this author’s regular duties, reveals that 19 of the 20 aviation security 
managers surveyed do not believe they receive adequate threat assessment information from DHS-TSA; the 
twentieth airport’s security manager was unavailable and did not respond to the survey.      
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aviation security managers to utilize in conducting vulnerability risk assessments at the 
nation’s commercial aviation facilities (White House, 2003a). As such, coupled with the 
problems associated with a lack of information sharing, the NAD remains vulnerable to 
exploitation and attack by the nation’s enemies.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Questions 
• To what extent, if any, may a form of intelligence-led policing be adapted 
to better secure the National Aeronautical Domain?   
• What is an effective and consistent threat appraisal methodology that 
could be utilized by U.S. aviation security managers in discerning current 
security posture, estimating future infrastructure requirements, and 
ultimately gauging the viability of countermeasures deployed in response 
to received threat assessment information within the National Aeronautical 
Domain? 
2. Secondary Question 
• Which effective policies and procedures could be adapted from the 
successful aviation security models of Israel, Great Britain and Australia? 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Consistent with the overarching intent of the 2007 National Strategy for Aviation 
Security (DHS, 2007b), the specific purpose of this literature review is to examine the 
existing body of scholarly work related to the improvement of the security of the National 
Aeronautical Domain. The assimilation, analysis, dissemination, and incorporation of 
threat assessment information into aviation security field operations is often broadly cited 
as a necessary step in better defending the NAD but little has actually been written 
regarding the substantial implementation of this process for local aviation security 
practitioners across the nation. Moreover, there is no practical guide or operational model 
instructing the local security manager how to institute an effective aviation-sector 
defensive plan that merges the disciplines of the intelligence process together with the 
risk assessment/management process. Accordingly, in order to achieve the goal of 
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developing a cogent national aviation security doctrine that fuses both the intelligence 
and risk management processes, three principal sub-categories of literature must be 
examined, namely: 1) a review of the U.S. Intelligence Community and processes; 2) an 
evaluation of applicable security risk assessment methodologies appropriate for use 
within the NAD and 3) an exploration of homeland security organizational models that 
might better achieve the critical objective of denying future adversaries’ access to the 
NAD.   
1. U.S. Intelligence Community and Processes 
In a civilian environment and long before the tragedy that befell the nation on 
September 11, 2001, members of the U.S. aviation security community understood the 
necessity for the timely intelligence preparation of the aviation security operating 
environment in order to appropriately plan and defend against potential adversaries to the 
NAD. Indeed, this point was  formally proffered in the 1989 President’s Commission on 
Aviation Security and Terrorism (President’s Commission)4when that investigative body 
noted the federal government’s fundamental failure to gather, assess and disseminate 
threat assessment information to local security partners in a timely and appropriate 
manner (White House, 1990). As a consequence of this finding, the Federal Aviation 
Administration, the TSA’s predecessor for aviation security matters, created the position 
of a federal security manager to serve as the “conduit for aviation-related intelligence” 
from the federal government to the local security manager (White House, 1990). 
Furthermore, in order to promote federal-local collaboration, section 3.23 of the 
President’s Commission Final Report also made the recommendation to “give properly 
cleared airline and airport security personnel access to the classified information they 
need to know” (White House, 1997). This proposal was submitted, according to the same 
report, because threat assessment information was being “sanitized” to the point of being 
irrelevant for the local authorities who are actually responsible for providing the majority 
of security countermeasures across the NAD.       
                                                 
4 This Commission was created in the aftermath of the 1988 bombing of Pan American Flight 103 over 
Lockerbie, Scotland.  
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Similarly, Chapter 13 of the 9/11 Commission Report determined that the IC had 
failed to properly share threat assessment information across the full spectrum of 
domestic security agencies in advance of the 9/11 attacks (subsection 13.3). Indeed, this 
revelation was specifically cited in that investigative body’s retrospective 
recommendation entitled, Unity of Effort in Information Sharing (subsection 13.3). In this 
section of the 9/11 Commission Report, the commissioners strongly repudiate the IC’s 
traditional Cold War era assumptions that information should be shared only on a “need 
to know” basis; rather, the 9/11 Commission Report authors cite a new standard of threat 
assessment information dissemination that should be adopted at all levels of government 
and referred to the concept as a culture that must recognize a “need to share” (subsection 
13.3). A plethora of other IC reports, programs and laws then emanated from the 9/11 
Commission Report recommendations related to the overall topic of the U.S. intelligence 
process. Notably among the changes borne from the 9/11 Commission Report’s work is 
the enactment of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 
(IRTPA).5   
The IRTPA serves as the legal instrument by which the IC is to be restructured, 
transformed and improved—for the benefit of organizations at all levels of government. 
Recognizing the disparate and autonomous nature of IC’s agencies, the IRTPA 
established a director of national intelligence (hereafter the “DNI”) to oversee all IC 
agencies and operations, inclusive of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Principally 
amongst the IRTPA’s Congressional mandates, then, of which there are many, the DNI 
has been commissioned to “promote intelligence information sharing within the IC” 
(Title I, Subtitle A, Sec. 1011). Furthermore, the IRTPA’s Title IV, Subtitle A (Sec. 
4011) requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to “develop and implement a National 
Strategy for Transportation Security and transportation modal security plans,” many of 
which are specifically related to the security of the NAD.      
                                                 
5 The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 was adopted by Congress on 
December 6, 2004.  
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National Security Presidential Directive-47/Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive-16 (NSPD-47/HSPD-16)6 mandated the further refinement and development of 
U.S. aviation security policy (White House, 2006). From the seven plans that sprung 
from NSPD-47/HSPD-16, the Air Domain Surveillance and Intelligence Integration 
Plan7 is most notable for this portion of the literature review (DHS, 2007a). Herein, the 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security provides an overview of the importance of threat 
intelligence sharing within the NAD and broadly defines its strategy to effect “air domain 
awareness” to all aviation security partners across the NAD. Indeed, this plan recognizes 
the essential use of threat assessment information as a “critical enabler” in aviation 
security operations for “operational decision-makers” within the domain (DHS, 2007a, p. 
1). But the relative value of threat assessment information is diminished, and a viable 
protective plan cannot be developed and implemented, unless aviation security 
practitioners understand exactly which critical assets are vulnerable to exploitation and 
attack.  
2. Security Risk Management and Methodologies  
Further complicating matters, beyond the basic assessments and standard 
countermeasures now mandated by the TSA, is the fact that a few U.S. airport security 
authorities have instituted a comprehensive, regimented and continuous risk management 
program that seeks to root out and address vulnerabilities in a proactive and recurring 
fashion. In fact, historically, most U.S. airport authorities simply establish the minimum 
TSA-mandated baseline protective measures and then adjust their security posture 
thereafter based upon known threats if and when they are identified. Consequently, a 
survey of the sub-literature associated with risk assessment methodologies applicable to 
the NAD is also within the scope of this research.  
                                                 
6 The NSPD-47/HSPD-16 was issued by President George W. Bush in June 2006, and directed the 
Department of Homeland Security, to develop a comprehensive U.S. aviation security policy.    
7 The Air Domain Surveillance and Intelligence Integration Plan was published on March 26, 2007 as 
a supplement to the National Strategy for Aviation Security ordered by NSPD-47/HSPD-16.   
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Presidential Decision Directive-29 (PDD-29) was signed in 1994 by President 
Bill Clinton and ordered the Joint Security Commission8 to develop and implement, 
among other plans, a risk assessment methodology more relevant for the federal 
government and its industry partners for the post-Cold War era (White House, 1994). 
From Chapter 1 of this PDD, a five-step risk management procedure was identified that 
sought to mitigate risk in a variety of applications by providing “a rational, cost-effective 
and enduring framework” for security decision-makers in both assessing risk and 
applying appropriate counterterrorism measures. The Central Intelligence Agency’s 
(CIA) Office of Security later refined this risk management model and labeled it 
“Analytical Risk Management” (Joint Security Commission, 2004). More recently, a 
2001 U.S. General Accounting Office report, Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk 
Management Approach, buttresses or corroborates the Joint Security Commission’s 
findings relative to the essential elements of a sound risk management program, and 
stresses that rather than value alone, the “criticality” of an asset must be also included in 
a security manager’s decision-making process (GAO, 2001a, p. 1).  
Superseding the May 1998 Presidential Decision Directive/N.S.C.-63 concerning 
“critical infrastructure protection,” Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7 (HSPD-
7) was signed by President George W. Bush in December 2003 (White House, 2003). 
HSPD-7 established a mandate for federal agencies to identify and prioritize U.S. critical 
infrastructure sectors and develop plans for each sector’s protection against future attack. 
This Presidential Directive resulted in the development of the National Infrastructure 
Protection Plan (NIPP). Emanating from the NIPP for the transportation sector, the 
Department of Homeland Security developed the Transportation Systems Critical 
Infrastructure and Key Resources Sector-Specific Plan (TSCI /KRP). The TSCI /KRP, 
which is inclusive of the U.S. Aviation Sub-Sector, establishes “a systems-based risk 
management strategy” to improve the overall security posture of the NAD (DHS, 2007c). 
                                                 
8 The “Joint Security Commission” was composed of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the 
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and their designees or commissioners, “to provide coherent 
security policy development, security policy evaluation and security policy oversight to the Defense and 
Intelligence Communities” (Joint Security Commission, 2004). The risk assessment models developed by 
this Committee were reportedly later adopted by both government and industry alike, but if so, the 
methodology has not been widely publicized within the current TSA-regulated aviation industry and the 
local level.    
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However, while very useful, it is important to note that the TSCI/KRP does not include 
either tactical or operational planning elements, save and except a short notation under 
the document’s Appendix A that mandates local airport operators’ responsibility to adopt 
“baseline measures” as promulgated by the TSA. Otherwise, the TSCI/KRP generally 
refers to the seven overarching federal programs linked to TSA’s National Strategy for 
Aviation Security,9 none of which details a specific risk-assessment/management 
methodology. As such, a brief survey of risk assessment methodologies is included herein 
for review.       
Several risk assessment methodologies (RAM) exist that are appropriate for the 
local security manager’s use within the NAD. For example, Sandia National 
Laboratories, in conjunction with the U.S. Department of Energy Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, has developed a variety of systematic RAMs applicable to most critical 
infrastructure/key resource (CI/KR) sectors to assess high-risk facilities and operations 
relative to four specific criterion: 1) discernment of various threats to both physical and 
cyber assets; 2) analyses of the vulnerabilities of the structure(s) or other assets to be 
defended; 3) determination of the likely results of a successful attack; and 4) 
determination of the most viable countermeasures to be deployed to mitigate risk. 
Similarly, the NI-2 Center for Infrastructure Expertise10 endorses the criticality, 
accessibility, recoverability, vulnerability, effect, and recognizability methodology 
(CARVER), and its variations, as a prudent means of conducting target analysis and risk 
assessment (NI2 Center for Infrastructure Expertise, 2009). Finally, the U.S. Department 
of Defense (DoD) Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Publication 3-07.2 Antiterrorism,11 specifies 
the use of the mission, symbolism, history, accessibility, recognizability, population and 
                                                 
9 The TSA’s National Strategy for Aviation Security is composed of seven aviation-specific plans, 
namely: the Aviation Transportation System Security Plan (2007); Aviation Operational Threat Response 
Plan (2007); Aviation Transportation System Recovery Plan (2007); Air Domain Surveillance and 
Intelligence Integration Plan (2007); International Aviation Threat Reduction Plan (2007); Domestic 
Outreach Plan (2007); and finally, the International Outreach Plan (2007).  
10 NI2 is a National Institute of Standards and Technology grant-funded group.  
11 Joint Publication 2-07.2: Antiterrorism is a 2006 publication by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff that 
provides detailed guidelines for military commanders on issues relative to force protection and risk 
assessment/management. The publication specifically endorses both the CARVER and MSHARPP risk 
assessment methodologies (DOD, 2006).    
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proximity methodology (MSHARPP) as another robust means to analyze likely targets 
and develop appropriate countermeasures (DoD, 2006). In summary, although not 
actively promoted by TSA, the local aviation security manager possesses access to a wide 
variety of bonafide resources related RAM; however, no particular functional structure 
has been instituted within the NAD to combine threat assessment information and RAM 
within the context of a predefined organizational model.  
3. Homeland Security Organizational Models 
Assuming that a local U.S. aviation security manager can achieve success in both 
receiving additional, enhanced and more timely threat assessment information, and also 
assuming that the same security manager is willing to institute a continuous risk 
management program, which type of organizational model should exist that would 
effectively tie or fuse these two functions together? The process of developing and 
maintaining a multi-layered, defense-in-depth security posture within the environmental 
dynamics of a major U.S. aviation facility is problematic. Consequently, an all-inclusive 
security management organizational methodology must also be adopted if success is to be 
achieved in better securing national aviation assets. Since U.S. aviation security managers 
have never embraced any type of an established security management construct, 
consideration should be given to management models developed in American policing. 
Intelligence-led policing (ILP), CompStat and community oriented policing (COP) are 
examples of police management organizational models that may be adapted for use 
within the air domain.    
Ratcliffe (2008) states that ILP is a police management approach that has evolved 
from CompStat and COP strategies, but “holds out the promise of a more objective basis 
for deciding priorities and resources allocation . . . [by] using an analysis-driven approach 
to decision-making” (p. 4). Carter (2004) explains that threat assessment information 
ought to form “part of the fabric of decision making” for organizational leaders, and 
denotes further that the concept of intelligence-led policing “is explained from an 
operational perspective, illustrating its interrelationship with community policing and 
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CompStat.”12 In summary, Carter draws a conclusion throughout his publication that both 
CompStat and ILP share many common elements that may be useful for aviation security 
managers, such as: 1) both management strategies focus on prevention, a key element of 
aviation security operations; 2) each policing style requires the collection of data, 
analysis of that data, as well as a nimble organizational response capability; and 3) both 
ILP and CompStat are influenced by operational needs with respect to reducing 
vulnerability to crime.  
Similarly, the U.S. Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Office of Community Oriented 
Policing defines community oriented policing as “. . . a philosophy that promotes 
organizational strategies, which support the systematic use of partnerships and problem-
solving techniques, to proactively address the immediate conditions that give rise to 
public safety issues such as crime, social disorder, and fear of crime” (DOJ, 2008). COP, 
in other words, presumes that an efficient crime control model may be achieved by the 
police partnering with the community, identifying the root causes of crime (“the 
problems”) and addressing them together as a community. To achieve this goal, a COP 
model requires police officers to become general practitioners in their field, as opposed to 
specialists operating in just one sub-category of law enforcement service.  
4. Summary 
While the historical issues and evolution of the U.S. intelligence process is a topic 
rich in subject matter, none of the literature surveyed denotes specifically how the 
problem of a “failure to share” information is to be overcome in any sector, much less 
within the NAD. The issues relative to defending the NAD are thus compounded by a 
lack of timely threat assessment information dissemination throughout the U.S. aviation 
sector. As a consequence of the gap in information flow from the IC to the local aviation 
security practitioner, then, regional security actors are left to formulate protective plans 
                                                 
12 The term “CompStat” refers to “computer statistics,” which is a program originally developed at the 
New York Police Department that utilizes statistical information to inform police commanders about issues 
related to criminal activity.     
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based principally upon the speculation of various threat streams13 vis-à-vis any 
risk/vulnerability assessments that may have been conducted for the facility and 
personnel to be protected. Given the fact that no particular aviation security doctrine has 
been established combining the aviation intelligence process with the risk 
assessment/management process, additional research is merited to determine if a 
particular homeland security organizational model, such as ILP, CompStat or COP, may 
achieve the desired results of merging the disciplines of intelligence and RAM with the 
ultimate goal of hardening the NAD against future adversaries. If this can be achieved, 
however, perhaps a foundation for aviation security doctrine may be established 
throughout the NAD.   
D. HYPOTHESIS 
The intent of an effective national aviation security program is to reduce risk by 
detecting, deterring, delaying and denying potential adversaries’ access to security-
sensitive segments of the NAD. In order to accomplish this goal, two indispensible 
elements must be received, fused and acted upon, specifically: 1) the timely receipt of 
credible threat assessment information must obtained by U.S. aviation security managers; 
and 2) a well-developed understanding of a target’s assets, vulnerabilities and contingent 
risks must be assessed by NAD security managers so that appropriate countermeasures 
may be then be deployed. In sum, tailoring aviation security strategies to both threat 
information and risk assessments, based upon local circumstances, will provide the most 
successful model for securing the NAD from evolving future threats, but currently no 
national operational security doctrine has been developed that formally inculcates an 
intelligence-driven, risk-based security strategy within the U.S. civil aviation 
infrastructure. Accordingly, the development and unified adoption of such a doctrine 
across the air domain would substantially improve U.S. aviation security.   
                                                 
13 The term “threat streams” is defined by this researcher as a potential route, direction or manner from 
which terrorism-related acts may emanate.   
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E. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
This research will principally benefit U.S. aviation security practitioners at the 
local level by providing a substantive policy option relative to better securing the 
National Aeronautical Domain. This will be accomplished by identifying and combining 
viable, “smart practices”14 for the aviation security manager within the realms of both 
intelligence policy and risk management/assessment strategy. Furthermore, considering 
the fact that no literature exists that specifically establishes a foundation for aviation 
security doctrine, this work product will also provide an organizational model for future 
homeland security professionals to build upon as the threat streams to the U.S. Air 
Domain evolve over the next several decades. Finally, this research may also benefit both 
the local and national policy maker, who has toiled with great effort since the published 
findings of the 9/11 Commission Report, to formally merge the threat intelligence process 
with the risk assessment/management process within the NAD.  
F. METHODOLOGY 
The policy options analysis methodology will be utilized for this thesis project. 
Accordingly, this research will identify and explain the various elements and problems 
relative to securing the NAD, particularly at the nation’s largest aviation facilities: FAA 
Category X airports15. A review of potential policy options will then be examined, 
inclusive of potential enhancements that may be realized from various organizational 
models, technological resources, as well as other successful international aviation 
security programs. The viability of these alternatives will then be compared and 
contrasted against conventional security strategies currently in effect. Finally, a 
recommendation will be made to adopt a policy option that best addresses the problem of  
 
 
                                                 
14 A “smart practice” is “something clever that the researcher must analyze, characterize in words, and 
appraise as to its applicability to the local situation” (Bardach, n.d.). 
15 FAA Category X airports are those that represent the nation’s largest and busiest airports as 
measured by overall passenger traffic and are therefore considered potentially attractive targets for 
criminal/terrorist activity (GAO, 1998).   
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better securing national aviation resources within the context of the evaluation criteria 
deemed vital for success in this endeavor. Hence, the three policy options cited below are 
outlined for consideration in this research plan. 
1. Policy Options 
a. Increase the Frequency of the TSA Risk Assessment Process 
Some improvements to the U.S. civil aviation security infrastructure have 
been realized since 9/11. For example, federalization of the screening workforce, 
standardization of the passenger/baggage screening processes and implementation of a 
broad-based triennial threat assessment of Category X airport facilities by TSA have all 
been incorporated within the NAD.  Since large commercial aviation facilities are 
typically under a perpetual state of construction, reconfiguration and expansion, however, 
a slight modification and improvement to the national aviation security posture may be 
realized if the triennial threat assessment currently mandated for Category X airports 
were required on an annual basis.      
b. Improve the Dissemination Element of the Intelligence Cycle16 
Within the NAD 
Homeland security intelligence processes have improved since 9/11, but 
instituting federal policies and procedures to further refine the dissemination element of 
the intelligence cycle may help ensure a more timely, regular and detailed distribution of 
threat assessment information to aviation security operators. This option might include 
the selective sharing of classified threat assessment information regarding emerging 
threats within the NAD, which may ultimately assist the local aviation security manager 
at Category X facilities in better understanding and responding to the overall threat 
picture within the aviation domain.    
                                                 
16 According to Johnson and Wirtz (2008), Intelligence and National Security: The Secret World of 
Spies, the U.S. intelligence cycle consists of five steps: planning and direction, collection, processing, 
analysis and production and dissemination (p. 49).     
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c. Institute an Intelligence-Driven, Risk-Based Security Doctrine 
Introduce federal legislation and or policies to mandate the improved 
sharing and utilization of threat assessment information, along with the incorporation of a 
standardized risk-based management methodology, into all U.S. aviation security 
programs at Category X airports across the nation. This option would necessarily also 
include a mandate for each local aviation security operator to institute an appropriate 
organizational model to analyze and respond to threat assessment information vis-à-vis 
specific risk appraisal and reduction criteria.  
2. Hierarchy of Criteria for Judging Success/Failure 
a. Legality  
Refers to the legal permissibility of state and federal statutes with regard 
to instituting recommended changes. 
b. Effectiveness  
The total projected benefit to be yielded upon implementation of any 
proposed changes.  
c. Political Acceptability  
Relates to the acceptability of any proposed changes by local, state and 
federal legislative and executive bodies; also to the American public as a whole.  
d. Level of Effort  
The total amount of energy or exertion required by the managing body to 
implement any recommended changes.  
e. Cost  
Refers to the monetary expense associated with implementing 
recommended changes. 
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3. Policy Options Matrix 
Table 1.   Policy Option Matrix 
 





A Low Yes Poor Minimal Minimal 
B Low to 
Med 
Yes Med Med Med 
C Med to 
High 
Yes High Med to High High 
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II. U.S. AVIATION SECURITY: AN OVERVIEW 
A. SIZE AND SCOPE OF THE U.S. NATIONAL AERONAUTICAL SYSTEM  
 
Figure 1.   Air Traffic Hubs 2009 (From U.S. Department of Transportation, 2009)  
The National Aeronautical Domain (NAD) is composed of a total of 18,345 civil 
aeronautical landing areas,17 and of this number, 413 are classified as “primary 
commercial service” aviation facilities (Wells, 2000, p. 46). Of these primary commercial 
service facilities, several principal categories of commercial airports are further identified 
and sub-divided by operational type, to wit: 1) Large-hub primary airports; 2) Medium-
hub primary airports; 3) Small-hub primary airports, and 4) No-hub primary airports 
                                                 
17 Wells & Young define civil aeronautical landing areas as all “airports, heliports, STOLports [short 
take-off and landing]” within the U.S., inclusive of approximately 13,000 private-use airports (2004, p. 
526).  
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(Wells & Young, 2004, p. 13). U.S. Code (U.S.C) Title 49 § 47102 defines Large-hub 
primary airports as those with annual enplanement populations of at least one percent of 
the total annual passenger enplanements accounted for within the United States. For 
aviation security purposes, the FAA and TSA also commonly know and refer to large hub 
aviation facilities as “Category X” airports. Similarly, medium-hub airports are defined 
by 49 U.S.C § 47102 as commercial service airports that facilitate the movement of at 
least 0.25 percent but less than one percent of the annual total passenger boardings within 
the United States. For aviation security purposes, these facilities are commonly known 
and referred to as “Category I” airports. Small hub airports are those commercial aviation 
facilities that enplane at least 0.05 percent but less than 0.25 percent of passenger 
boardings annually (U.S.C 49 § 47102). Non-hub commercial service airports are defined 
by 49 U.S.C § 47102 as those with less than 0.05 percent of total U.S. passenger 
boardings per year.   
For federal aviation security purposes, the U.S. General Accounting Office 
(GAO) cites the existence of 27 Category X, and 55 Category I, airports in the United 
States (GAO Report GAO-07-299, 2007). Other categories of airports within the small- 
and no-hub classifications are recognized by the FAA and TSA as well, such as 
Categories II, III and IV varieties. However, not all of these aviation facilities are capable 
of accommodating either large annual passenger populations or large commercial 
aircraft.18This factor is a significant consideration in air domain threat analysis due to 
both aircraft fuel and passenger load capacities.  Accordingly, as compared to Category X 
facilities, since Category I, II, III, and IV airports are much smaller in both physical size 
and overall passenger enplanement capacity they will not be included within the scope of 
this research.  
Within the framework of the nation’s commercial aviation infrastructure, the U.S. 
Department of Transportation’s Bureau of Transportation Statistics (DOT) reports that a 
total of 618,113,048 passengers traveled on domestic flights during calendar year 2009 
(DOT, 2010). Based upon a 365-day year, this statistic equates to approximately 1.7 
                                                 
18 For the purposes of this research, large, commercial aircraft are considered Boeing 747, 757, 767, 
and 777 varieties. This list is only a representative sample, however.  
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million passengers per day transiting through America’s primary commercial service 
airport complexes. Wells & Young (2004) cite that approximately 70 percent of this total 
passenger traffic is funneled through Category X airport facilities (p. 15). Therefore, the 
overwhelming mass of all aviation passenger traffic is enplaned through relatively few 
very large facilities, a significant fact when considering network theory19 in the allocation 
of security resources across the NAD.   
The following graphical representation outlines the percentage of U.S. aviation 
facilities within each of the aforementioned airport classifications. Consequently, as 
reflected in the below-referenced chart, Category X and Category I commercial aviation 
facilities represent only about 18 percent of the nation’s largest and busiest airport 
facilities in terms of geographic size, passenger enplanement levels, as well as total 
aircraft landings and departures. In order to devote the majority of attention and scare 
resources to the most critical segment of the U.S. air domain, then, the focus of the 
security strategy presented in this research project will center upon the geographically 
large and vastly populated, yet relatively small number of Category X airports within the 
U.S. NAD.       
                                                 
19 In his book Critical Infrastructure Protection in Homeland Security, Ted Lewis at the U.S. Naval 
Postgraduate School defines network theory as the study of “a collection of nodes and links that connect 
pairs of nodes” and “provides a formal foundation for a scientific study of critical infrastructure protection” 
(Lewis, 2006, p. 77).  
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Figure 2.   Commercial Airports by Airport Security Category as of April 2006 (From 
GAO, 2007) 
B. POST-9/11 EVOLUTION OF U.S. AVIATION SECURITY 
Ensuring the adequate defense of the NAD is vital to both the physical and 
economic security interests of the United States. As a critical component of the national 
transportation infrastructure, the collective and sustained efforts of all levels of 
government must come to bear upon the deterrence, detection, denial and delay of future 
adversaries to the NAD. This fact is particularly true today in the aftermath of the 
September 11, 2001 (9/11) tragedy—a disaster that left almost 3000 innocent people 
dead, national symbols of strength and wealth destroyed and damaged, along with the 
unprecedented closure of the U.S. civil aviation transportation system.20  With this 
horrific act as the impetus, the nation’s leaders immediately recognized that the enemies 
that attacked America on 9/11 continued to plot against U.S. national interests with the 
                                                 
20 Based upon the 9/11 Commission testimony of Secretary of Transportation Norman Y. Mineta on 
May 23, 2003, the NAD had never been ordered completely closed to civil aviation assets in the history of 
aviation (Mineta, 2003).  
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intention of replicating the same type of catastrophic physiological and psychological 
damages, death and destruction that the world witnessed on 9/11.  
Indeed, the long-term, post-9/11 commitment of al-Qaeda to attack America by 
exploiting the aviation domain has been evidenced in the following cases, specifically:  
• The December 22, 2001 attempt by al Qaeda operative Richard Reid in his 
failed attempt to detonate an explosive device concealed in his shoe while 
in flight aboard American Airlines Flight 63, a transatlantic flight from 
France to the United States;  
• The 2006 al Qaeda plot against commercial airliners uncovered and 
thwarted by British counter-terrorism agencies in Operation OVERT,21 
and  
• The December 25, 2009 attempt by al-Qaeda operative Umar Farouk 
Abdulmutallab in his failed attempt to detonate an explosive device 
concealed in his undergarments while in flight aboard Northwest Airlines 
Flight 253, a transatlantic flight from the Netherlands to the United States.   
Understanding that America had been thrust into an international conflict with a 
committed, ideologically-driven enemy using unconventional weapons and tactics the 
likes of which had never before been witnessed, shortly after September 11, 2001, the 
President and U.S. Congress immediately responded by launching the Global War on 
Terror (GWOT). This reaction, in addition to the global deployment of military and law 
enforcement assets, also resulted in the creation of a myriad of investigative bodies, 
legislative reforms and realignment of homeland security and defense resources. For the 
national aviation sector, chief among these earliest counterterrorism plans were the 
Aviation Transportation Security Act of 200122 and the creation of both the 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA)23 and U.S. 9/11 Commission.24 The U.S. 
                                                 
21 Operation OVERT was announced on August 10, 2006 by British Home Secretary Dr. John Reid. In 
his public statement, Home Secretary Reid revealed that British counter-terrorism agencies had detected 
and disrupted an al- Qaeda plot to attack transatlantic airliners en route from the United Kingdom to the 
United States where flights to New York, Washington, D.C., and California were to be destroyed in flight 
by al-Qaeda operatives who had smuggled liquid explosives on-board (Reid, 2006).   
22 This was created by the President and Congress by Public Law 107-71 on November 19, 2001.  
23 This act also transferred the responsibility of aviation security from the Federal Aviation 
Administration to the newly created TSA.   
24 This was created the President and Congress by Public Law 107-306 on November 27, 2002.  
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Department of Homeland Security (DHS)25 was subsequently created and assumed, 
among many other duties, operational responsibility and oversight for the nation’s 
aviation security through the newly formed TSA.  
C. SECURITY WORKGROUPS WITHIN THE U.S. AVIATION DOMAIN  
Although a more in-depth analysis of both U.S. airport security operators’ and 
TSA’s Office of Security Operations (TSA-OSO) security responsibilities will be 
included later in this chapter, the following summary provides an overview of the various 
other law enforcement and security workgroups that operate at U.S. Category X airports. 
Accordingly, U.S. airport security operators liaison with, and oftentimes support, the 
following agencies: 
1. Local Law Enforcement 
49 U.S.C § 1542.217 requires U.S. airport security operators to provide uniformed 
police officers in the number and manner adequate to support its aviation security 
program. This support may be provided either by a proprietary law enforcement service 
(police officers employed and commissioned by the airport authority itself) or via a 
contractual agreement with an outside police agency with the local airport security 
operator. Both law enforcement support models are common within the NAD; but as the 
regulated party, it should be noted that the local airport security operator ultimately 
retains the responsibility and regulatory liability from TSA for any infractions or 
violations committed by local law enforcement personnel vis-à-vis any of the 
requirements stipulated by the federal code as it relates to law enforcement support and 
response.       
2. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)  
Since major aviation facilities represent targets of high-value for various terrorist 
factions, most Category X airports host a contingent of FBI special agents known and  
                                                 
25 This was created by the President and Congress by Public Law 107-296 on November 25, 2002. 
This act also transitioned the administration and oversight of the TSA into DHS.  
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referred to as “airport liaison agents.” This federal law enforcement presence is due 
principally to the FBI’s primary role in investigating acts of terrorism pursuant to the 
mandates of the 28 U.S.C § 533.    
3. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
The DHS maintains several components of its organization in Category X airports 
across the nation. For example, while the Federal Air Marshal’s Service (FAMS) provide 
some airport security services on an ad-hoc basis, the crux of the FAMS mission lies in 
providing covert, armed personnel aboard commercial aircraft in flight to interdict acts of 
air piracy and hostage-taking. Since Category X airports are also typically international 
ports of entry as prescribed by U.S. Customs and Immigration law, the U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection Service (CBP) provides federal inspection services for international 
travelers, baggage and products presented for admission into the U.S. from foreign 
destinations. CBP’s sister agency, the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Service 
(ICE), provides the federal law enforcement support necessary for CBP in investigating 
suspected violations of customs and immigration law. More specifically, ICE’s mission 
includes the interdiction of human, narcotics, currency, arms and other forms of 
international trafficking schemes. On a daily basis, however, local airport security 
operators interact with the TSA-OSO in the proactive security of the NAD.   
D. DIVISION OF AVIATION SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES: TSA-OSO 
PRINCIPAL ROLES 
Among the many sub-components that now compose the federal transportation 
security apparatus, the TSA’s-OSO for the aviation sector has subsequently been 
commissioned to perform very limited operational security duties within the NAD as well 
as disseminate specific threat assessment information to authorized individuals at the 
nation’s airports. More specifically, the TSA field office personnel deployed at the local 
level are assigned three primary tasks by law, that is: 1) to screen passengers and baggage 
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for prohibited items;26 2) to ensure regulatory oversight and implementation of federally-
mandated rules at local airport facilities; and 3) to ensure dissemination of threat 
assessment information and provide conditional assessments of the same to aviation 
security policy stakeholders (U.S. Congress, 2002). Unfortunately, TSA is currently only 
fulfilling responsibilities one and two, a fact which will be addressed later in Chapters III 
and IV of this thesis. Nevertheless, as the federal statutes relate to the TSA’s crucial 
mission functions, Public Law 107-71 provides the following specific mandates for TSA 
pursuant to Title I of the Act:  
§ 114. (f):  (1) receive, assess, and distribute intelligence information 
related to transportation security; 
(2) assess threats to transportation security; 
(4) make other plans related to transportation security, including 
coordinating countermeasures with appropriate departments, agencies, and 
instrumentalities of the United States Government; 
(7) enforce security-related regulations and requirements. 
These basic TSA duties and responsibilities have been further supplemented since 
their initial adoption by the promulgation of seven different aviation security plans that 
were ordered by Presidential Directive 47/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 16 
(NSPD 47/HSPD 16). Together these plans constitute the National Strategy for Aviation 
Security (DHS, 2007b). Of particular importance within the National Strategy for 
Aviation Security (NSAS), in 2007 the Secretary of Homeland Security stated, in relevant 
part, that “. . . public and private sectors must work together to improve national security 
by: sharing threat information . . .” (DHS, 2007b, p. 13). Furthermore, the Air Domain 
Surveillance and Intelligence Integration Plan, one of the seven appendant strategies 
referenced above, specifically cites the intent of this particular measure is the 
coordination of “requirements, priorities, and implementation of national air surveillance 
resources and the means to share this information with appropriate stakeholders” (DHS, 
2007a, p. 1).  
                                                 
26 Although the initial identification of prohibited weapons in passenger and baggage screening is a 
principal function of TSA at local airports, the retention and disposal of these identified weapons, and the 
arrest(s) of suspects, etc., is generally the responsibility of local airport authorities.  
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In sum, TSA, specifically TSA’s Office of Security Operations, is responsible for: 
1) working with airport operators/authorities to develop baseline security measures at all 
legally recognized U.S. airport facilities; 2) provide both specific threat assessment 
information as well as overall NAD threat assessments to stakeholders, and 3) regulate 
individuals and entities at airport facilities subject to the regulatory control and oversight 
of TSA as mandated by the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations. When coupled with the 
U.S. Office of the  Director of National Intelligence’s (ODNI) 2008 report entitled 
Information Sharing Strategy, the main theme of which is moving the Intelligence 
Community27 (IC) from a culture of “need to know” into a culture of “responsibility to 
provide,” two clear legal and operational expectations emerge: 1) that the TSA Office of 
Security Operations is expected to partner with local airport operators to develop 
coherent baseline aviation security measures; and 2)  the TSA Office of Security 
Operations is responsible for the regular and timely dissemination of both national threat 
assessment information as well as more specific threat assessment information to local 
airport operators. Without a doubt, both of these components are critically necessary if 
commercial airport operators are to develop and maintain effective aviation security 
programs. This type of collaboration is especially necessary for local aviation security 
program managers who seek to be proactive and extend protective plans beyond that 
which is minimally required by the current static, federally mandated baseline 
measures.28  
                                                 
27 The IC is a federation of executive branch agencies and organizations that work separately and 
together to conduct intelligence activities necessary for the conduct of foreign relations and the protection 
of the national security of the United States (ODNI, 2008). 
28 This simply means that local airport authorities may wish to voluntarily enhance their airport’s 
security posture above and beyond what the federal government has mandated as minimum standard, but 
are unable to do so effectively because of the lack of threat assessment information forthcoming from 
federal intelligence resources.    
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E. DIVISION OF AVIATION SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES: LOCAL 
OPERATOR’S29 ROLES 
In the United States, most of the large commercial airport facilities are owned by 
either governmental entities or “quasi-governmental bodies” (Wells, 2000, p. 46). 
Irrespective of an airport’s status of legal ownership, however, the body or group that 
manages the facility is known and commonly referred to as an “airport operator.” 49 
C.F.R. § 1542 governs the specific TSA-mandated aviation security requirements of a 
U.S. airport operator. Cited in relevant part for this thesis, the aviation security 
requirements of a U.S. airport operator, pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 1542, are to: 
• Develop and maintain a TSA-approved Airport Security Plan (ASP)30 that 
identifies the baseline31 security measures that the airport operator will 
incorporate at the facility (§ 1542.101); 
• Identify one individual to act as the Airport Security Coordinator (ASC) to 
serve as the immediate contact for security-related activities and 
communications with TSA (§ 1542.3); 
• Provide detection and physical security measures of the “secured area,” 
i.e., the most security-sensitive area(s) at an airport where aircraft fueling 
and enplanement/deplanement of passenger operations are conducted (§ 
1542.201); 
• Provide detection and physical security measures for the “Aircraft 
Operations Areas” (AOA), i.e., the areas that encompass the taxiway and 
runway systems where aircraft operate (§ 1542.203); 
• Provide detection and physical security measures for the “Security 
Identification Display Area” (SIDA), i.e., the area of an airport where 
aircraft fueling and loading/unloading of cargo operations are conducted 
(§ 1542.205);  
                                                 
29 TSA defines “airport operator” as a person that operates an airport serving an aircraft operator of a 
foreign air carrier required to have a security program under part 1544 or 1546 of this chapter (49 C.F.R. 
Part 1540, et. seq.).  
30 The ASP represents a formal written agreement between the TSA and the airport operator and 
specifically outlines what the airport operator must do, as a minimum standard, to ensure aviation security. 
The ASP does not prohibit an airport operator from instituting additional security measures on its own, 
however. Additionally, the ASP document is not as comprehensive as most asset, threat, vulnerability and 
risk-assessment studies.  
31 “Baseline” security measures are those recurring functions and actions that local airport operators 
must undertake to ensure aviation security. Many of these functions are standardized and mandated by TSA 
headquarters personnel. Failure to fulfill these minimum standards may result in the airport operator’s civil 
liability. 
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• Implement and maintain an Access Control System to ensure unauthorized 
access to security-sensitive areas of an airport complex remain secure (§ 
1542.207); 
• Provide a fingerprint-based criminal history records check (CHRC) for 
individuals seeking unescorted access to secure areas of an airport (§ 
1542.209); 
• Provide an identification or credentialing system for all employees who 
seek unescorted access to security-sensitive areas of an airport (§ 
1542.211); 
• Provide security training for security personnel (§ 1542.213); 
• Provide law enforcement officers in a sufficient number and manner to 
support the ASP (§1542.215);  
• Develop, maintain and implement upon TSA’s demand, a contingency 
plan to counter threats to aviation security that may arise (§ 1542.301); 
• Establish procedures to evaluate bomb threats, threats of sabotage, aircraft 
piracy, and other unlawful interference to civil aviation operations (§ 
1542.307).  
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
As demonstrated by the legal citations referenced above, the actual physical 
deployment of most aviation security resources at airport facilities across the NAD is the 
principal responsibility of the local airport security operator. This point is made not to 
diminish the critical role of the TSA in the aviation security mission, but rather to 
demonstrate that:  
• Apart from baggage and passenger screening responsibilities, U.S. airport 
operators actually control and maintain the bulk of the personnel, 
technology and physical infrastructure resources necessary to effectively 
maintain the security of the NAD;  
• That individual airport operators retain the legal responsibility to provide 
aviation security countermeasures across the NAD; and  
• Considering the foregoing, there is a critical need for the local security 
operator to receive timely, regular and accurate threat assessment 
information from the U.S. Intelligence Community, inclusive of classified 
information, in order for security assets to be managed and deployed most 
effectively beyond the TSA-mandated baseline measures found in a 
commercial airport’s ASP.  
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As already referenced in this chapter, the TSA-OSO has focused the 
preponderance of its time and resources on both screening operations and regulatory 
compliance of local airport security operators, leaving the threat assessment element of 
its statutory mandate nearly untouched. As a consequence, while screening and 
regulatory compliance mandates are fundamentally necessary to the overall security of 
the NAD, so too is the dissemination of threat assessment information component of 
TSA’s mission. This supposition is especially true if local airport security operators are to 
remain proactive, flexible and adaptive in countering emerging threat streams within the 
NAD.     
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III. U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND CIVIL AVIATION 
SECURITY  
By the word ‘information’ we denote all the knowledge which we have of 
the enemy and his country; therefore, the foundation of all our ideas and 
actions. (Clausewitz, 1832) 
A. INTRODUCTION: WHY IS AVIATION THREAT ASSESSMENT 
INFORMATION NECESSARY FOR LOCAL SECURITY MANAGERS? 
In his quote from over 177 years ago, General Karl von Clausewitz expresses the 
strategic understanding that threat assessment information is critically necessary in 
forming the basis of all operational planning when fighting a determined adversary. 
Likewise, in the war on terrorism that began in 2001 with the exploitation of commercial 
aviation assets, the current mission of the U.S. civil aviation sector is to defend against 
another catastrophic terrorist attack on the U.S. homeland from the exploitation of this 
same sector of the nation’s critical infrastructure. Success in this type of a defense can 
only be achieved by formulating effective aviation security programs that reduce risk by 
detecting, deterring, delaying, and denying potential adversaries’ access to security-
sensitive segments of the NAD.  
To accomplish this goal, the timely receipt of threat assessment information 
represents a fundamental component to understanding and subsequently mitigating threat 
streams because the development, deployment and efficacy of potential countermeasures 
are contingent upon information received and utilized at the field level of execution. In 
other words, threat assessment information aides in both the specific and general 
identification of the types of techniques, tactics and procedures against which security 
managers may need to defend, especially in the field of critical infrastructure protection. 
This “need to know,” then, is relevant for regional actors32 at both the federal and local 
levels who are charged with protective services responsibilities.  
                                                 
32 “Regional security actors” (also “regional actors”) is defined by this researcher as the local Federal 
Security Director appointed by DHS-TSA as well as the lawfully designated Airport Security Coordinator 
appointed by a particular airport authority. 
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In his book Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, Dr. Mark Lowenthal notes that 
the principal reason intelligence agencies  exist is to collect, produce and disseminate 
threat assessment information and “to keep track of threats, forces, events, and 
developments that are capable of endangering the nation’s existence” (2009, p. 2). While 
non-state actors such as al-Qaeda probably pose little threat to endangering the existence 
of the U.S., another successful attack directed against America’s critical infrastructure 
utilizing commercial aviation resources could, nonetheless, produce a disastrous effect 
not just upon the aviation sector, but upon the populace of the U.S.—physically, 
psychologically and economically. Thus, the continuous receipt and utilization of threat 
assessment information by security managers is necessary to help prevent and or mitigate 
the overall threats, vulnerabilities and consequences of terrorism emanating from within, 
or otherwise directed toward, the U.S. aviation sector.       
B. INTELLIGENCE: DEFINED 
But specifically, what is the difference between “intelligence” and “information”? 
Lowenthal (2009) establishes this distinction as “information is anything that can be 
known, regardless of how it is discovered. Intelligence refers to information that meets 
the stated or understood needs of policy makers and has been collected, processed, and 
narrowed to meet those needs” (p. 1). Consequently, in order to produce threat 
assessment information that can exploited, the U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC) 
engages in a specific cyclical process as represented in the graph below.33 
As graphically demonstrated by the FBI’s intelligence cycle below (see figure 3), 
the U.S. cycle of intelligence flows in a specific, continuous manner in the following  
 
                                                 
33 This thesis’ co-advisor, Mr. Paul Smith, a retired intelligence professional from the UK’s MI-5 
(British Security Service), endorses an intelligence cycle with only four components: 1) requirements, 2) 
collections, 3) analysis, and 4) action. According to Smith, this is because the “dissemination” of a report, 
as denoted in the U.S. version of the intelligence cycle cited hereinabove, should not necessarily become 
the outcome of requirements. Smith notes that dissemination of a report “may” be an outcome, but so could 
the deployment of a surveillance team or other action in the field, not just a written report. However, since 
research for this thesis project reflects the model graphically represented herein as that which is 
predominant within the U.S. at the time of this writing, the U.S. model is used with this important notation 
included for the reader’s clarification and future consideration (Smith, 2010).          
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order: 1) requirements; 2) planning and direction; 3) collection; 4) processing and 
exploitation; 5) analysis and production; and 6) dissemination. Each segment of the 
process is explained as such: 
According to Lowenthal (2009), the requirements and planning and direction 
phases of the intelligence process, phases one and two, respectively, are typically 
influenced by policy makers who determine “those policy issues or areas to which 
intelligence is expected to make a contribution” (p. 55). In the case of U.S. civil aviation, 
for example, policy-makers and strategists alike may wish to identify particular threats to 
the aeronautical domain. For instance, the identification of:  
• Which groups or individuals represent a threat to U.S. civil aviation,  
• The specific targets within aviation’s critical infrastructure area, and or  
• The intent and current/future capabilities of the potential adversaries 
identified.  
In phase three of the process, collection, Lowenthal (2009) notes that general 
information, not intelligence, is gathered by one or more methods at this point (p. 55). 
Carter (2009, p. 63) cites those various methods of intelligence collection as:  
• Human intelligence (HUMINT), which is the use of human beings to 
solicit and collect information;  
• Signals intelligence (SIGINT), which is a generic term for the electronic 
interception of information being transmitted/received (for example, from 
an electronic signal generated by a telephone/radio/email/etc.);  
• Imagery intelligence (IMINT), which is that information derived from 
photography, infrared image capture, satellites, radars, etc.;  
• Measurement and signatures intelligence (MASINT), which is the 
“analysis of electronic emanations from equipment and seeks to detect 
information patterns in a different part of the electronic spectrum not 
previously captured by other methods”;  
• Open source intelligence (OSINT), which is the analysis of information 
available to the general public.  
The FBI’s intelligence cycle phase four is identified as processing and 
exploitation. In this segment, collected information begins the transformation of 
becoming intelligence after, according to Carter (2009), four considerations are made:  
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1. Evaluation of the raw data is made by intelligence analysts with regard to 
source reliability and information validity;  
2. Evaluation of the method of data collection is conducted;  
3. Integration/collation of new data with existing information has been 
completed; and  
4. De-confliction, with pre-existing information suggesting contrary results 
or expectations, has been reconciled (pp. 64–65).  
The fifth phase, analysis and production, is the center of the intelligence process. 
At this stage, the analytic process is begun in earnest by analysts utilizing both 
quantitative as well as qualitative research methodologies to develop previously collected 
segments of information into intelligence products.       
Dissemination represents the sixth and final phase of the FBI’s intelligence cycle 
before it repeats itself. Futhermore, according to Lowenthal (2009), is the process of 
transferring finished intelligence products “from the producers to the consumers” (p. 62). 
Carter (2009) concludes his discussion of the dissemination phase by noting that the post-
9/11 philosophy of sharing information is supposed to be “radically different” in that now 
intelligence information is supposed to be shared as widely as possible with those who 




Figure 3.   The Intelligence Cycle (From FBI, 2010)  
C. AVIATION INTELLIGENCE 
To maximize Air Domain awareness, we must transform, and integrate 
capabilities that collect, analyze, and disseminate surveillance, intelligence 
and information to create an operational picture that is tailorable to the 
needs of users across the United States government, as well as at State, 
local, and tribal levels . . . (DHS, 2007a, p. 17)  
In his February 2005 article in The Journal of Airport and Airline Security, 
aviation security author Robert T. Raffel buttresses the DHS 2007 National Strategy for 
Aviation Security by suggesting that there are three primary threat assessment 
information sources for local aviation security managers: 1) open source information; 2) 
local law enforcement; and 3) classified DHS-TSA threat assessment information. 
Considered in their totality, these information resources provide, according to Raffel: 1) 
trend analysis; 2) situational awareness; and 3) vulnerability/risk-assessment capabilities. 
However, while open source information and local law enforcement resources may be 
beneficial for supplemental informational purposes, the focus of this thesis chapter is 
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centered upon the importance of local dissemination of national threat assessment 
information that is collected, processed and analyzed at the federal level. This is because 
the U.S. Intelligence Community receives information from global resources that are 
critical to all segments of the NAD as identified by Raffel’s elements of analysis, 
awareness, and assessment from a much broader perspective. As such, if threat 
assessment information were shared more regularly with local security partners, then 
pragmatic changes and supplements to any one particular airport’s security plan may be 
augmented accordingly, thus providing a more tailored, more proactive approach to 
aviation security nation-wide. Otherwise while adjustments to a regional airport’s 
security posture may be made based upon locally-generated information, a potentially 
serious gap may occur if international and national resources are not collated and 
disseminated by the U.S. federal government. In conclusion, the potential viability of an 
aviation security program is contingent upon two indispensible elements: 1) the accurate 
and efficient use of anti-terrorism resources as suggested by the trends, tactics and 
procedures identified in USIC intelligence products as well as locally-generated 
intelligence information; and 2) the acquisition and deployment of those resources 
against pre-identified risks as indicated by a comprehensive ATVRA.  
Figure 4 demonstrates the flow and potential usefulness of intelligence products 
within the air domain at the local level. Flowing from the right to left in the graph below, 
Raffel notes that open source information, threat assessment information from the TSA 
and local law enforcement may all flow through the airport security operator and 
ultimately produce meaningful results for improving an overall state of aviation security, 
to wit: 1) trend analysis; 2) situational awareness; and 3) vulnerability and risk 
assessment information. The practical field application of threat assessment and 
vulnerability/risk assessment information is outlined in more detail in the next chapter 




Figure 4.   The Airport Information Sharing Environment (From Raffel, 2007) 
D. AVIATION INTELLIGENCE AND STRATEGIC PLANNING 
How does intelligence-based threat assessment information actually inform and 
influence operational decision-making within the National Aeronautical Domain? 
While the nature of, and need for, intelligence-based threat assessment 
information within the aviation domain may not be dissimilar from that which is 
necessary in other critical infrastructure domains, such as in the rail and maritime 
industries, the commercial aviation environment is unique in many ways. First, as 
outlined in Chapter II of this thesis, the repeated attempts of terrorist operatives to 
penetrate attacks within the NAD remains evident. As a known high-value target 
environment, then, both the criticality and utility of efficiently, effectively and 
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consistently sharing threat assessment information across the full spectrum of aviation 
security organizations at the local and federal levels is made apparent.  
The focus of our adversaries on air transportation is explained, at least in part, by 
the potential lethality of an another attack within the NAD in terms of the high number of 
human causalities that could reasonably be expected, as well as by the tremendous overall 
negative impact upon the U.S. economy if successfully executed. Second, although most 
transportation centers share the commonality of condensing large concentrations of 
people together in one location, the air domain presents a particularly enticing target 
environment for terrorist organizations. This is especially true because transient 
populations within these centers remain extremely high during normal hours of operation, 
which accounts for about 16 hours out of a day, seven days per week, year around. Third, 
in order to accommodate large transient populations, particularly at Category X aviation 
facilities, a perpetual state of major construction is typically seen at airport facilities 
across the nation. Therefore, since airports represent a unique, dynamic and ever-
changing physical environment with large numbers of people typically present—and is a 
threat environment that continues to be the focal point of our nation’s enemies—a 
consistent flow of threat assessment information is necessary for security operators so 
that protective plans may be updated as necessary. For these reasons, this is true perhaps 
even more so in the aviation environment than in either the rail or maritime sectors noted 
hereinabove.  
Accordingly, the immediate, mid- and long-term development of strategic 
security plans—inclusive of operational/maintenance budgets and field plans, capital 
infrastructure development and protection, and security policy development—may be 
greatly informed by the use of threat assessment information. This is true in three distinct 
areas of aviation security, specifically:  
1. In planning new facilities;  
2. In planning the expansion and reconfiguration of existing facilities; and, 
3. In managing an active operational security plan for an existing facility that 
is currently occupied and in use.  
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For instance, in the aviation domain where large capital building projects are 
oftentimes programmed and planned several years prior to construction and utilization, 
security managers could provide more meaningful input into the security design phase of 
a project by better understanding emerging terrorist trends, tactics, techniques, and 
procedures. In these cases, if threat assessment information were available that identified 
certain emerging threat patterns, tactics and techniques, then the original design of a 
facility could be constructed to diminish exposure to those threat vectors. Through and by 
utilization of a crime prevention concept known as “crime prevention through 
environmental design (CPTED), perimeters, for example, could be protected by 
decorative ponds, manmade streams, the placement of trees, etc. as effective barriers to 
from a point critical to protect; parking lots and curbsides that could be chosen as ideal 
points for the detonation of explosive devices could be strategically placed to mitigate 
those weaknesses by increasing stand-off distances, and terminal buildings could be 
constructed out of less glass to diminish the effects of sharding34 at areas vulnerable to 
improvised explosive attacks, load bearing walls and beams could be reinforced to 
withstand the impact of certain levels of bomb blast overpressures.   
Similarly, in retrofitting the physical configuration of an existing aviation facility, 
for example a terminal building built in the 1960s, at a time in history when bomb 
incident prevention plans were not yet required for most domestic buildings in the U.S., 
an aviation security manager could be more effective. For example, an appropriately 
informed security manager informed by threat assessment information may “harden”35 an 
existing facility against attack, or otherwise make more informed decisions regarding the 
acquisition and deployment of physical and human countermeasures in order to layer the 
protective resources throughout a high-value target and area. Moreover, threat assessment 
information may be of great utility for determining the type, quantity and placement of 
                                                 
34 “Sharding” is a term commonly used to refer to pieces of glass, steel, and concrete, among other 
materials, that have been broken apart into small fragments and propelled forcibly through the air by the 
overpressures created by a bomb blast. In this context, in addition to the physical trauma potentially 
imparted to human beings as a proximate result of bomb blast overpressures, “shards” of material represent 
the very dangerous secondary consequences of a bomb blast to humans when detonated adjacent to 
physical a structure. This is similar to shrapnel propelled from a detonated grenade, for example.    
35 In this context, “harden” means to reinforce against the vulnerability to attack or otherwise diminish 
the ultimate consequences of the same.    
 38
anti-terrorism countermeasures, such as bollards, fencing materials, the implementation 
of technology as guard force multipliers, and so on. Suffice to say, then, threat 
assessment information is absolutely critical if one is to make informed decisions 
regarding the acquisition and implementation of physical countermeasures, technology 
and policy development for guard force operations.  
As argued above, the notion of incorporating strategic, risk-based planning into 
local aviation security programs is even more critical in a post-9/11 environment where 
U.S. commercial aviation assets are still considered high-value targets. Moreover, while 
strategic planning based upon threat assessment information is necessary in order to more 
efficiently acquire and deploy an aviation security organization’s resources on an ad-hoc 
basis as threat information is received, another fundamental element of the security 
planning process is necessarily coupled with the risk assessment process of the facility to 
be guarded, which is more of long-term approach to security planning and budgeting.  
More specifically, in developing and managing an effective aviation security 
program, beyond deploying security resources in a totally random and potentially 
ineffective piecemeal fashion, a comprehensive asset, threat, vulnerability and risk-
analysis (ATVRA) of the facility to be protected should be conducted utilizing a 
standardized risk assessment methodology—one that should be identified by DHS and 
implemented throughout U.S. aviation. Simply stated, in order to better explain how 
intelligence-based threat assessment information may help solve problems relative to 
threats within the aviation domain, in conjunction with intelligence-based threat 
assessment information, the use of a comprehensive ATVRA aides in the following topic 
areas to reduce overall contingent risk. The following is an example of how and why 
threat assessment information must be incorporated in risk-based planning to improve the 
U.S. aviation domain’s overall security posture:  
Given any Category X aviation facility in the U.S., the designated local security 
manager should utilize a standardized process to complete the following tasks: 
1. Identify all assets necessary to ensure a continuity of business operations 
so that security managers know specifically what may need to be 
protected. Examples may include, but are not limited to: terminal 
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buildings, roadway systems, runways, and support facilities, such as 
central plants. Other critical on-site infrastructure may include such topic 
areas such as: electrical, water, natural gas, and aviation fuel pipelines and 
supply feeds. 
2. Through a review of all available intelligence-based threat assessment 
information, security managers possess a situational awareness of the 
potential threat streams against which a facility should be defended. 
Consider, as an example only, if threat assessment information were 
received that indicates al-Qaeda possesses a long-term interest in 
exploiting the fuel farms and supply lines to an airport storage facility’s 
10-million gallon reserve of highly volatile jet fuel (Jet-A). The security 
manager would: a) identify this fuel storage facility as a critical asset, and 
b) know and understand that it constitutes a potential target for terrorist 
operatives; 
3. By conducting a review and comparison of all assets as well all the 
known/suspected quantum of threats that may be directed toward a 
Category X aviation facility, security managers may make more informed 
decision which threats may be most likely to be target, and thus 
understand what the vulnerability/likelihood of occurrence is for the types 
of attacks/hazards. Take for example again the fuel storage facility 
scenario referenced above, the security manager may also be informed 
now as to the potential capabilities, tactics, techniques, and procedures 
that may be employed by al-Qaeda. Understanding this perspective, to the 
extent available anyway, then facilitates a security manager’s 
understanding as to: a) the priority to which the fuel the storage system 
should be ranked on a security projects list, and b) providing some insight 
as to which types of countermeasures must be acquired and deployed to 
best defend the target area;  
4. The overall risk to the facility studied is then better understood because 
the contingent, real, or residual risk is identified after the less likely 
threats/attack scenarios are eliminated from the threat picture. As such, a 
relative weight may then be assigned to each vulnerability mitigated to 
determine the amount of overall risk reduction achieved with any given 
countermeasure deployed;  
5. Once contingent risk is identified from the most probable, specific threats 
considered, then protective resources/countermeasures may be designed, 
developed, implemented, or otherwise acquired to mitigate the known 
contingent risk based upon the efficacy of each measure instituted as 
described hereinabove.  
Accordingly, threat assessment information utilized in the completion of an 
ATVRA allows site-specific vulnerabilities to be identified and subsequently addressed 
with a tailored approach for aviation facilities dependent upon the physical, 
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environmental, financial, and human resources available to each facility’s security 
manager. The critical element of intentionally coupling threat assessment information 
with the ATVRA process into the aviation security planning program will be considered 
in detail in Chapter IV of this thesis.  
The critical point emphasized and demonstrated in this segment of this research 
project, however, is the vital role that intelligence-based threat assessment information 
should play in the protection of U.S. aviation airport facilities. Currently, the process 
identified hereinabove has not been institutionalized by the DHS-TSA across the 
aeronautical domain, thus leaving U.S. commercial aviation more vulnerable to 
exploitation and attack than is necessary and reasonable, despite DHS-TSA’s stated intent 
to approach U.S. aviation security in a collaborative, layered and intelligence-led manner.    
E. INTELLIGENCE RESPONSIBILITIES WITHIN THE AERONAUTICAL 
DOMAIN  
Ultimately, the backbone of protecting the United States from threats in 
the Air Domain is an active, layered security and defense. Air Domain 
awareness, achieved through persistent situational knowledge provided to 
operational decision-makers, is a critical enabler in achieving this 
capability. (DHS, 2007a, p. 5) 
As alluded to in the Air Domain and Intelligence Integration Plan cited above, the 
potential success of an effective anti-terrorism plan is contingent upon thwarting the 
element of strategic surprise enjoyed by an adversary (DHS, 2007a, p. 5). In fact, 
Johnson and Wirtz (2008) state that “providing warning against surprise is central to both 
official and public perceptions of the fundamental role of intelligence services” (pp. 28–
29). Accordingly, if the element of surprise is mitigated, an attack may either be 
frustrated by the deployment of effective countermeasures, or at least the ultimate 
consequences of the attack may be altogether diminished to a reasonable level. 
As referenced in Chapters I and II of this thesis, the USIC member legally 
responsible for providing threat assessment information to local aviation security 
managers is the TSA Office of Intelligence and Warning. Facilitating the dissemination 
of classified and restricted materials is oftentimes impeded, however, due to two issues: 
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1) technological constraints; and 2) a lack of trained intelligence analysts deployed 
forward across the aeronautical domain and attached to TSA field offices to advise and 
brief Category X security practitioners at the local level. More specifically, relative to 
technology, local security managers are oftentimes unable to procure classified/law 
enforcement sensitive intelligence products that may supplement the quantum of 
knowledge available from open sources materials because the necessary equipment to 
legally and securely transmit and or receive classified and law enforcement sensitive 
intelligence products has not been acquired by the local security manager.36  
This is not to suggest that when exigent circumstances exist emergency provisions 
could not be made by the “owner”37 of the information to convey critical details. But for 
the local aviation security manager in the day-to-day planning and future deployment of 
protective resources based upon an intelligence-led/risk-based model security model, the 
continuous flow of open source, law enforcement sensitive, and classified information is 
necessary in order to maintain a broad-based situational knowledge of terrorist events and 
trends within the air domain. To that end, local aviation security managers, as operational 
decision-makers, should give serious consideration to acquiring secure communications 
equipment, with the sponsorship of the local TSA field office, for both emergency as well 
as routine planning and operational use. As such, local security managers should 
recognize that they possess an affirmative duty to work with their local TSA field offices 
in acquiring not only classified security clearances and access to intelligence networks 
such as the DHS’s Homeland Secure Data Network,38 but secure telephones and 
facsimile equipment as well, in order to facilitate the timely and lawful transmission of 
threat assessment information from the broader USIC.  
                                                 
36 Note, however, that the acquisition of a secure telephone to transmit SECRET level information, 
commonly referred to as a Secure Terminal Unit (STU Phone) is a National Security Agency regulated 
product, and as such, the local security operator must have a DHS-TSA sponsor to acquire such technology. 
Accordingly, this type of technology may not unilaterally be purchased by a unit local government.  
37 The term “owner” of classified threat assessment information is a reference to the individual or 
agency from which the information originates, by whom the subsequent dissemination of which is 
oftentimes controlled, or restricted.    
38 According to GAO Report 04-375, the Homeland Secure Data Network is administered by DHS and 
is intended to be the technological means by which the federal government shares sensitive and classified 
homeland security information with state and local partners (GAO, 2004b, p. 50).    
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The second impediment, related specifically to the lack of trained intelligence 
personnel deployed forward in the field to advise and brief local security managers 
regarding intelligence-based threat assessment information, continues to be problematic 
regarding the dissemination/sharing of intelligence information across the domain. 
Simply put, for whatever internal reasons that may exist, DHS-TSA simply has not made 
intelligence analysts available to, and actively engaged with, local aviation security 
mangers across the U.S. This fact is buttressed by the survey heretofore referenced in 
Chapter I of this thesis, wherein 19 of the U.S.’s 27 Category X airport security managers 
opined that DHS-TSA had not achieved success in this topic area.  Moreover, what is 
confounding about this persistent problem, is that the DHS, and vicariously the TSA, is a 
designated member of the USIC and is the legally responsible party for disseminating 
intelligence information across the aeronautical domain to local stakeholders.39 The TSA 
possesses the legal authority to sponsor federal security clearances for local security 
managers; and finally, many local security counterparts wish to buttress their security 
operations with input from the intelligence community providing general guidance, hence 
the repeated calls for more intelligence sharing from many domains—inclusive of many 
outside of aviation—in conjunction with the similar findings of the U.S. 9/11 
Commission. But, again, despite DHS-TSA’s legal authority and responsibility in this 
matter, as well as the aviation community’s repeated requests for intelligence-based 
threat assessment information, positive results have not been forthcoming.       
Intentionally deviating from the USIC and DHS-TSA information-sharing 
problems discussed herein, in a bottoms-up intelligence collection strategy for regional 
aviation security operators, local security managers may also help ensure the protection 
of facilities by acquiring technologies related to intelligence information generated at the 
operational level. This is particularly true in situations at the local level where the 
execution of an attack scenario may be commenced, having gone previously undetected 
and pre-empted by intelligence and law enforcement entities outside of the air domain. In  
 
                                                 
39 Recall, for example, that the topic of legal responsibility for sharing intelligence information across 
the aeronautical domain rests with the TSA. See Chapter I and II for a review of this discussion and the 
legal references pertaining to this subject area.  
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these cases, in addition to human detection and intervention of an attack, technology may 
serve as a force multiplier by adding additional layers of defense by forewarning airport 
security organizations of approaching dangers.  
In this regard, local security operators may develop and deploy trip wires,40 even 
virtual trip wires, around their most sensitive facilities in order to develop local indication 
and warning systems at the field level of operation. For example, license plate reader 
technology deployed along a local roadway may provide early warning of a pre-identified 
motor vehicle-borne threat travelling inbound toward an airport facility. Similarly, closed 
captioned television units placed strategically throughout an airport complex may provide 
situational awareness of the perimeter, as well as the internal and external environs of the 
terminal complex. Moreover, a combination of technologies integrated together may 
provide an even more robust, defense-in-depth/layered security posture for U.S. aviation 
facilities. 
A more detailed discussion of the specific technological components noted above 
is beyond the scope of this research project, but they are nonetheless mentioned herein 
for three principal reasons:  
1. To prompt the local aviation security manager to think about and consider 
their own responsibilities in regard to acquiring proprietary systems 
related to the generation of their own operational intelligence—and not 
simply relying totally upon the DHS-TSA to presumably provide all that is 
necessary relative to site protection intelligence; and  
2. To draw a distinction between operational intelligence for indications and 
warnings at the local level and the real impetus of this chapter, which is to 
define and outline the structure and practical uses of USIC, DHS-TSA 
intelligence-based threat assessment information in the aeronautical 
domain; and  
3. In addition to human sources of intelligence developed at the local level, 
to understand that from a bottoms-up approach to the nation’s aviation 
security posture that the types of technological systems referenced herein 
may also provide opportunities, and indeed responsibilities upon local 
security operators, to collect—within the boundaries of the U.S. 
                                                 
40 A “tripwire” is a wire or line that activates a weapon, trap, or camera, for example, when pulled 
(The Free Dictionary, 2010).While human intelligence sources may also be utilized as trip wires, in the 
context used here the reference relates to a technological collection platform that may serve as force 
multiplier in the early warning process in the event of an immediate threat to an aviation facility.  
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Constitution—certain types of information from these system and pass the 
same upstream to the USIC via the DHS-TSA.       
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has defined the term “intelligence,” in the normal usage and context 
of the U.S. Intelligence Community, as information that has been collected, analyzed, 
processed, and disseminated for a particular requirement as determined necessary by a 
U.S. policy-maker. This chapter also discussed the U.S. intelligence process through and 
by use of the intelligence cycle. Most importantly, this chapter identified and explained in 
great detail the critical nature of threat assessment information within the aeronautical 
domain and the manner in which intelligence-based threat assessment information may 
be used to better protect the U.S. National Aeronautical Domain through the preparation, 
budgeting, and planning processes relative to the aviation security industry.  
With this introduction into intelligence completed, detailed discussions regarding 
the formal role of intelligence into both the formal risk-assessment process and 
introduction of the intelligence-led policing concept within U.S. commercial aviation 




IV. RISK MANAGEMENT 
Almost every aspect of infrastructure protection is sorely lacking in 
foundational theory, scientific proof of effectiveness, and applied tools 
and techniques. Indeed, the very basic task of identifying what is critical, 
and measuring its vulnerability, is currently inadequate and poorly 
understood by the people whose responsibility is to implement the national 
strategy. (Lewis, 2006, p.60)  
A. INTRODUCTION 
In addition to the receipt and dissemination of intelligence-based threat 
assessments and information, why is the discipline of risk management a 
necessary component in the strategic planning process for both the 
federal government and local aviation security managers? 
From the national government’s perspective, the impetus to develop a strategy to 
protect the U.S. homeland’s critical infrastructure predates the publication of the 2003 
National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets 
and the 9/11 tragedy. This is evidenced by President Clinton’s 1994 order, pursuant to 
Presidential Decision Directive-29, for the federal government to develop and implement 
a coherent risk assessment methodology for the U.S. in a post-Cold War period. In 1998, 
recognizing that “. . . future enemies whether nations, groups or individuals, may seek to 
harm us in non-traditional ways including attacks within the United States,” President 
Clinton again addressed the issue of critical infrastructure protection by signing 
Presidential Decision Directive-63, which purpose was to “propose and develop ways to 
encourage private industry to perform periodic risk assessments of critical processes . . . 
to develop security-related best practice standards” (White House, 1998). After the events 
of 9/11, the 9/11 Commission also issued a recommendation on the topic of risk 
management by acknowledging that “in a free-for-all over money [for the acquisition of 
homeland security assets] . . . resources must be allocated according to vulnerabilities” 
(2004, p. 396).  
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Furthermore, from a national viewpoint, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 
created the DHS and charged the department with, among other duties, a mandate to 
identify a system by which to identify and prioritize U.S. critical infrastructure assets and 
subsequently develop plans for each sector’s protection. From this directive emanated the 
National Infrastructure Protection Plan (hereafter the “NIPP”), which includes by 
reference the Transportation Systems Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Sector-
Specific Plan (DHS, 2007c).  
Unfortunately, however, none of these plans serve to inform the local aviation 
security manager specifically that risk assessment methodology (RAM) should be utilized 
in the risk management process within the air domain. In fact, there is still no one risk 
assessment methodology standard that has been instituted by DHS, despite President 
George Bush’s subsequent 2003 requirements for a comprehensive risk management 
approach for critical infrastructure protection pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive -7 (HSPD-7), with the U.S. aviation domain being no exception to this rule.  
This wicked problem41 plagues the federal government from both an operational 
and resource allocation perspective, and equally afflicts the local security manager in 
strategic budgeting and operational planning. Lewis (2006) corroborates this point by 
noting, “Currently there is no standard; hence, it is impossible to compare vulnerabilities 
across jurisdictions or sectors. And yet DHS requires vulnerability analysis” (p. 7).  
From a local aviation security managers’ position, the practical or operational 
aspects of this problem are driven home by the repeated attempts of adversaries to exploit 
aviation assets in the United States. For example, on August 13, 2006 Secretary of 
Homeland Security Michael Chertoff ordered the NAD to elevate the security posture of 
the entire civil aviation infrastructure to DHS Level ORANGE contingency conditions 
                                                 
41 According to Dr. Jeff Conklin, a “wicked problem” has four defining characteristics: 1) the problem 
is not fully understood until after the formulation of a solution; 2) stakeholders have radically different 
world views and different frames for understanding the problem; 3) constraints and resources to solve the 
problem change over time; and 4) the problem is never solved (Word IQ, 2010).  
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(Chertoff, August 13, 2006).42  This order continues in effect at the time of this writing 
(August 2010), which serves to affirm a reasonable supposition that terrorists still 
consider U.S. civil aviation assets/facilities targets of high interest. As such, the efficient 
and effective management of aviation sector anti-terrorism countermeasures/security 
programs continues to be vitally important in order to mitigate risk. But before risks can 
be effectively reduced, local aviation security managers must know and understand 
specifically, or at least generally to the degree that threat assessment information may 
provide, which particular assets are at the greatest vulnerability of attack and need to be 
protected. The only way to determine vulnerability and contingent risk, then, is to 
conduct a comprehensive risk assessment and subsequently devise a risk management 
program to address identified weaknesses. This type of a security survey is especially 
important in large, public use aviation facilities.43     
Moreover, unlike military air bases that may either close or otherwise choose to 
funnel the ingress of people and materiel to certain checkpoints points for inspection 
prior to entry during periods of heightened threat, U.S. civil aviation facilities may not 
typically restrict access in the same manner. To the contrary, a vast majority of U.S. civil 
aviation facilities are open and are in fact designed to facilitate ease of ingress/egress to 
public areas. Additionally, U.S. Category X airport facilities provide not only for the 
movement of people and commerce across the nation and world, but also act as power 
economic engines for the geographical regions in which they serve44.  
With limitations on security spending an inevitable business necessity in order to 
maintain financial solvency, as is true in most critical infrastructure sectors, the efficient 
                                                 
42 DHS defines Level ORANGE as a “HIGH Risk of Terrorist Attacks” (DHS, 2010). Moreover, DHS 
Threat Level ORANGE imposes many additional aviation security requirements upon airport security 
operators during heightened periods of alert. For example, increased security visibility, screening, internal 
audits and the deployment of physical countermeasures are required for a commercial airport facility to 
remain in DHS-TSA regulatory compliance, all of which strain financial, physical and human resources.   
43 This is because Category X aviation facilities conduct hundreds of daily flight operations, employ 
thousands of workers at each location who have access to aircraft, and move millions of passengers every 
year. As such, these facilities are very large, very busy transportation centers and are inherently vulnerable 
to criminal exploitation/attack.   
44 Consider, for example, that the 2003 Economic Impact Study for the Houston Airport System’s 
three airports in Houston, Texas reportedly supports over 151,000 jobs in the Houston metropolitan area 
and contributes approximately $24 billion annually to the local economy (Houston Airport System, 2010).  
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utilization of security resources,45 then, becomes a matter of strict prioritization based 
upon the specific airport’s contingent risks vis-à-vis its assets, threats and 
vulnerabilities—all of which are subject to change based upon the intent, adaptability and 
capabilities of adversaries. Lewis (2006) acknowledges the vital importance of critical 
infrastructure protection and risk management, and its inextricable nexus to threat 
assessment information, by stating that “the lack of information sharing causes 
inefficiencies and vulnerabilities in the war against terrorism,” and that the struggle to 
secure our nation’s critical infrastructure against today’s ideologically driven adversaries 
“. . . is particularly vulnerable to asymmetric46 attacks” (pp. 49–50).   
B. THE CONCEPT OF RISK MANAGEMENT AND ANALYSIS 
GAO report 02-150T defines risk management as “a systematic, analytical 
process to consider the likelihood that a threat will harm an asset or individuals and to 
identify actions to reduce risk and mitigate the consequences of an attack” (2001, p. 3). 
While security experts generally agree that there is no 100 percent guarantee that all 
threats to a facility can be completely mitigated, Jenkins (1998) notes that the process of 
risk analysis is a means by which to identify organizational threats and vulnerabilities and 
“identifies the probable consequences or risks associated with the vulnerabilities and 
provides the basis for establishing a cost-effective security program” (p. 1). Furthermore, 
Jenkins (1998) reveals that the process of risk management “implement[s] and 
maintain[s] countermeasures that reduce the effects of risk to an acceptable level” (p. 1).  
Finally, when considering the various elements of threat analysis, security practitioners 
should be mindful to consider both manmade as well as natural threats to infrastructure, 
the latter of which relates to weather events such as hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes, 
and any other type of unwanted event that may compromise the operational functionality 
of a particular site to be protected.  
                                                 
45“Security resources” include, but are not limited to: people, technology, machinery, physical 
infrastructure, etc.   
46 Lewis defines asymmetric warfare as “the art of force multiplication using nontraditional techniques 
such as converting jumbo jets into bombs, using the public broadcast media to spread propaganda and gain 
public support for a cause, and creating terror and mass destruction or economic disaster through forced 
attacks on infrastructure that millions of people depend on” (2006, p. 18).  
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Yacov Haimes outlines the risk assessment process in his June 2002 article in the 
Journal of Infrastructure Systems. With respect to the assessment function, according to 
Haimes, the security professional must attempt to answer the following three questions in 
order to begin to understand risk in any given environment: 1) what can go wrong? 2) 
what is the likelihood that it could go wrong? and 3) what are the consequences? 
Similarly, Sandia National Laboratory’s Risk Assessment Program represents the 
components of risk as: threat (likelihood of attack), consequence of adversary success, 
and likelihood of adversary success (protection system effectiveness). Intelligence-based 
threat assessments would be of great utility to the security practitioner at this phase of the 
risk assessment process because they may serve to better inform the assessors of: 1) The 
likelihood of attack based upon the suspected motives of an adversary; and 2) The 
likelihood of a successful attack based upon the suspected capabilities of an adversary.  
The aforementioned elements of the risk assessment process are represented in 
Figure 5.   
 
Figure 5.   Components of Risk (From Sandia National Laboratories, 2009) 
Once the questions relative to assessment are answered, Haimes (2002) asserts 
that the risk management process may be formulated by asking three additional 
questions, namely:  
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1. What can be done and what options are available?  
2. What are the trade-offs in terms of all costs, benefits, and risks?  
3. What are the impacts of current management decisions on future options?  
In GAO report 07-386T (GAO, 2007), the federal government divides the process 
of risk management into five distinct phases:  
1. Setting strategic goals and objectives while determining constraints;  
2. Assessing the risks;  
3. Evaluating the alternatives for addressing these risks;  
4. Selecting the appropriate alternatives; and  
5. Implementing the alternatives and monitoring the progress made and the 
results achieved. In weighing costs and benefits to manage risk.  
However, Lewis (2006, p. 103) submits that the “80:20% rule”47 should also be 
applied, meaning simply that since financial resources to protect everything cannot 
typically be appropriated, as a rule of thumb, 80 percent of financial resources should be 
spent on roughly 20 percent of the most sensitive components of a critical infrastructure 
site that are identified by the formal risk assessment process.  
Finally, in a March 2008 article published in the Journal of Homeland Security, 
Pat Jones and Yolanda Edmunds summarize the U.S. Navy’s concept of risk analysis and 
management for naval facilities in the following steps: 
1. Identify the broad set of attack types that could occur at Navy 
installations; 
2. Review current Navy intelligence information to differentiate the 
likelihood of each type of attack; 
3. Define the role of the functional capability set in preventing or mitigating 
each attack type; 
4. Define levels of capability set implementation and performance; 
5. Fuse threat, vulnerability, and criticality information to develop an overall 
risk characterization; 
                                                 
47 The “80–20 rule” cited by Lewis (2006) may also be known as the “Pareto Theory.” Developed by 
Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto in 1906, the theory may be extrapolated by security practitioners, as 
Lewis suggests, as a reminder to focus on the 20 percent of business activities or critical infrastructure most 
vital to a particular operation—in this case, commercial aviation security operations at Category X airport 
facilities (About.com, 2010).  
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6. Generate risk-based measures of effectiveness and cost measures for each 
functional capability set. 
Similar to the Sandia National Laboratories risk assessment methodology (Sandia 
National Laboratories, 2009), Jones and Edmunds (2008) express the above-referenced 
steps as a linear equation, such that: risk = threat x vulnerability x criticality 
[consequence].  
C. RISK MANAGEMENT METHODOLOGIES 
In his remarks delivered to the DHS Grants and Training National Conference in 
2006, DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff stated, “We have to have a common approach, a 
coordinated approach across all phases of what we have to do to create homeland 
security” (Chertoff, 2006). Similarly, Baker (2005) declares, “ To understand and correct 
exploitable susceptibilities of critical infrastructure facilities, infrastructure providers and 
regional planners need a common, repeatable, systematic methodology to understand the 
comparative risks and vulnerabilities and determine where to invest scare resources” (p. 
1). Yet, despite the requirements of HSDP-7 to develop a consistent risk assessment 
methodology, along with the similar requirements of the NIPP, the latter of which only 
generally describes the risk assessment process, no one particular risk assessment 
methodology has been adopted by DHS for the aviation sector.  
The fact that a common risk assessment methodology has yet to be identified and 
utilized within the aviation domain is not due to a lack of options. To be certain, a 
plethora of RAMs exist within the homeland security arena. As two examples, the U.S. 
military has utilized both the criticality, accessibility, recoverability, vulnerability, effect, 
and recognizability methodology (CARVER), as well as the mission, symbolism, history, 
accessibility, recognizability, population, and proximity methodology (MSHARPP) 
offensive target prioritization tools for many years. Both of these methodologies assist 
warfighters in identifying the attractiveness of potential battlefield targets, but again are 
offensive target prioritization tools for military planners. As such, while assessing a 
target’s relative value may be useful for a security manger in determining which sites or  
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facilities should be given first priority in the strategic planning process, at least from an 
adversary’s perspective, these particular tools do little to aid in the risk assessment 
process from a defensive standpoint.48  
Likewise, Sandia National Laboratories has developed various RAMs for U.S. 
critical infrastructure and key resources, to include assessment methodologies for: 
energy, water, and chemical facilities. The U.S. Coast Guard has adopted the maritime 
security risk assessment model (MSRAM) for use at our nation’s seaports, but none of 
these methodologies have been adapted for use, and subsequently endorsed by TSA, for 
airport security operators whose task is to protect the physical infrastructure of U.S. civil 
aviation facilities.    
In an attempt to address the RAM void within the aviation domain, however, the 
TSA’s Aviation Security Impact Assessment Working Group has been field testing the 
U.S. Commercial Aviation Partnership’s (USCAP) risk management assessment tool 
(RMAT). USCAP refers to this tool as an “econometric tool,” meaning simply that it 
attempts to quantify the economic impact of proposed security measures within the 
aviation domain.  However, according to Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor 
R. John Hansman in his 2006 remarks concerning RMAT’s nomination for the Franz 
Edelman Award,49 the tool “. . . does not include a threat mitigation analysis component 
(e.g., the benefit in a classical cost benefit [analysis]).” As such, the RMAT simply 
endeavors to calculate the potential costs of security policies and procedures within the 
aviation domain (e.g., [fluctuation of] ticket prices, passenger enplanement numbers, 
etc.), but does not inform the security manager what the anticipated return on a particular 
security investment will be after deployment. Additionally, there is no evidence that 
RMAT does anything to identify assets, threats, or non-economic50 risks and 
                                                 
48 In this context, “defensive standpoint” questions, for example, who may attempt to attack a facility? 
How might they achieve a successful attack? What is the likelihood of the attack’s success? What potential 
impact will an attack have on facility’s operational functionality? And finally, what, if anything, can be 
done mitigate both the opportunity and or consequences of an attack?  
49 The Franz Edelman Award is an annual competition given for “the discipline of applying advanced 
methods to help make better decisions” (Operations Research: The Science of Better®, 2010).   
50 While most risk management strategies involve some level of economic consideration because of a 
potential for business interruption, what is meant here by “non-economic risks” is simply a juxtaposition 
between the financial and physical consequences of an attack.   
 53
vulnerabilities. There is, however, one particular asset-based RAM that does assess the 
overall security and operational risks of commercial aviation facilities that may, if 
formally adopted by DHS, provide consistent, repeatable and sustained results across the 
nation. 
Alea Holdings, LLC. in Dallas, Texas has developed a RAM referred to as 
INTELOS Airport (INTELOS)51 (Alea Holdings, L.L.C., 2010).  This RAM software 
package utilizes a series of proprietary algorithms to assess and calculate the overall 
security, engineering, operational, and country risks for global aviation infrastructure 
assets. As such, the calculated outputs of this program include numerical, linguistic, and 
color coded reports related to:  
1. A standardized overall risk grade for the facility assessed, inclusive of the 
protective elements currently deployed as countermeasures for the assets 
protected;  
2. Specific recommendations to improve security as related to costing; 
3. Specific budget allocation recommendations; and  
4. Relates financial risk to a standardized grading system for use in budget 
presentations. 
Finally, as an additional benefit, the INTELOS program utilizes and produces 
CARVER offensive targeting data as an alternative means of assessing the relative value 
an adversary may assign to various components of any given aviation facility, which, as 
previously noted herein, is valuable supplemental information for consideration and use 
by the aviation security manager in balancing and expending scare resources.    
D. CONCLUSION 
Managing risk is a fundamental element in adequately securing the U.S. National 
Aeronautical System from future attack. The first step in accomplishing this task begins 
                                                 
51 In the interests of full disclosure, this researcher’s employer, the Houston Airport System (HAS), 
and its subsidiary, the HAS Development Corporation, participated in the initial development of this RAM 
product by providing subject matter expertise and airport data to Alea Holdings, LLC. However, the 
INTELOS Airport program was developed, and is wholly owned and controlled, by Alea Holdings, LLC. 
Likewise, since this software is owned by a private-sector company, this author has no means by which to 
validate the algorithms utilized in the program; however, the preliminary results of the Intellos tool in 
Houston has provided promising results by yielding detailed information regarding the Houston Airport 
System’s current security posture, security infrastructure and security budgeting requirements.    
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with DHS and its responsibility to adopt a standardized RAM within the aviation domain. 
By doing so, regardless of the RAM ultimately adopted by DHS, several specific benefits 
related to aviation security should be realized.  
First, the adoption of one of the aviation RAM will provide a common base or 
understanding of threat assessment within the industry and allow regional security 
partners at the local and federal levels to evaluate threats, vulnerabilities, and contingent 
risks with a high degree of repeatability and relative accuracy—nationwide—so that 
effective security risk management plans may then be executed. Second, the unique 
strengths and vulnerabilities of particular airport facilities, once identified, may then be 
addressed with a tailored approach at each of the nation’s airports dependent upon the 
physical, environmental, financial, and human resources available to each facility. Third, 
the federal government may then appropriate security funding on a more equitable and 
consistent basis across the nation’s airport authorities. Fourth, the inevitable variations in 
the type, amount and frequency of the countermeasures deployed at each individual 
airport facility should result in a more random and unpredictable threat mitigation 
strategy across the nation, thus potentially forcing adversaries to either abandon a 
particular plan—such as in a multiple, simultaneous coordinated attack scenario—or 
otherwise expend appreciably more time and resources conducting pre-attack 
surveillance.52 In short, at the very least, delaying an adversary’s attack plan will provide 
security and law enforcement groups a greater opportunity to identify the plot prior to the 
execution of an actual attack. And finally, fifth, the financial and logistical burden to the 
U.S. government of providing one specific RAM to Category X airports across the 
nation, inclusive of the necessary training to teach the appropriate use of the RAM, would 
be minimal. This is true particularly given the enormous projected return on this 
investment in terms of increased security across the air domain, and ultimately, for the 
nation as a whole.  
                                                 
52 The effective utilization of available resources to thwart potential attacks is related to, and 
consistent with, the generally accepted security philosophy of detecting, deterring, delaying, and denying 
adversaries to the NAD. As a result of delaying an attack, then, local security, intelligence resources and 
law enforcement will be provided with a greater opportunity (more time) to uncover and disrupt a terrorist 
plot prior to attack. Recall, for example, the UK’s 2006 successful disruption of terrorist operatives in 
Operation OVERT.  
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E. BRIEF SUMMARY OF THESIS KEY POINTS THUS FAR  
In this and the preceding chapters, this thesis has attempted to make the following 
points:  
1. That the NAD is a vital resource to the United States for both mobility as 
well economic security reasons. 
2. That the NAD is a large and complicated domain that terrorists still wish 
to attack and potentially utilize for another 9/11-style attack. 
3. That intelligence-based threat assessment information is a necessary 
component in developing and sustaining a viable aviation security 
program across the nation.  
4. That formalized risk assessments and risk management programs also 
constitute a critical component in developing and sustaining a viable 
aviation security program across the nation.  
But the question now arises as to how all of these elements should be meshed 
together in an organizational and operational sense within the air domain. Chapter VI will 
explore this particular issue in more detail, but after Chapter V considers certain aspects 
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V. INTERNATIONAL AVIATION SECURITY PERSPECTIVES 
A. BACKGROUND 
The use of commercial aircraft to perpetrate the terrorist attacks upon the United 
States on September 11, 2001, left not only this country, but the international aviation 
community as a whole, to struggle with security problems in a post-9/11 threat 
environment. Endeavoring to solve these problems in the United States a dialogue 
emerged that revealed three principal competing interests. Specifically, unrestricted by 
the barriers of U.S. law, politics or cost, how might a maximum level of aviation security 
be realized within the National Aeronautical Domain (NAD)? More to the point, the 
unique geopolitical circumstances of the U.S. notwithstanding, which policies, tactics and 
procedures currently in use by other countries might prove to be of utility if appropriately 
adapted within the criteria cited hereinabove?  
This central question of national security interest continues to be asked almost 
nine years after the 9/11 tragedy. Consequently, the intent of this chapter is to discern 
whether or not the aviation security program of the United States may be enhanced by 
adopting some of the most effective techniques, tactics and procedures of three U.S.-
allied countries that are also engaged in the critical work of improving the security 
posture of the international aviation community. Accordingly, this policy research will 
specifically analyze the aviation security models of the State of Israel, the 
Commonwealth of Australia, as well as the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland—all democratically administered governments—to ascertain and 
ultimately determine the viability of certain key elements of each government’s aviation 
security model as they may relate to, and ultimately buttress, the current aviation security 
program of the United States. 
Before this discussion begins, however, one may rightly question, “Why should 
we care what other countries do with regard to aviation security?” What is the “so what” 
for security practitioners, politicians and citizens alike in the U.S. to consider foreign 
perspectives relative to this issue? The answer is twofold.  
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First, as a matter of national security for the U.S., there is a practical interest in 
knowing whether other countries have instituted meaningful, consistent, and effective 
aviation security measures for those flights in-bound into the United States. Second, since 
this thesis considers potential security improvements to the U.S. NAD by such means as 
improved intelligence collection and dissemination, incorporation of a specific risk 
assessment methodology and enhanced security group organizational models, it may 
prove useful to determine if any foreign aviation security programs have already 
remedied any related problems. Therefore, if the U.S.-allied nations of Israel, the United 
Kingdom and Australia have achieved certain successes related to the same, then perhaps 
adaptations to these various foreign programs may add value in solving some of the 
ongoing security problems currently being experienced in the U.S. NAD.    
B. PROBLEM 
As evidenced by the U.K.’s 2006 liquid bomb threat, as well as the unsuccessful 
bombing of a U.S. airliner on Christmas Day in 2009,53 the post-9/11 threat environment 
reveals that commercial aviation assets remain a high-value target for non-state sponsors 
of terrorism. However, rather than focusing on the identification and neutralization of 
potential actors at aviation facilities who may try to perpetrate these acts, the U.S. 
aviation security community continues to focus chiefly upon locating the weapons, or 
“things,” that may represent a hazard to civil aviation assets. 
C. SCOPE 
The following table provides a brief overview of the commercial aviation 
environments of the United States, Israel, UK, and Australia. 
                                                 
53 This is a reference to Delta Flight 253, a transcontinental flight from Amsterdam to Detroit, 
whereupon Nigerian national Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab attempted to detonate an explosive device just 
prior to landing in the U.S.  Abdulmutallab smuggled the device on board the aircraft by concealing the 
explosives in the groin area of his trousers.   
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Table 2.   Statistical and Regulatory Comparison of International Aviation 
Environments Surveyed 
 U.S. Israel UK Australia 
Number of Major 
Airport Facilities 
























1. United States 
As specifically noted in Chapter II of this thesis, and subsequently incorporated 
again herein by reference thereto, the U.S. NAD constitutes a very large, diverse and 
complicated array of primary commercial service aviation facilities. In short but relevant 
repetition, however, it is within this framework of the nation’s commercial aviation 
infrastructure that the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), Bureau of 
Transportation Statistics reported a total of 618,113,048 passengers traveled on domestic 
flights during calendar year 2009 (DOT-Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2010). Based 
upon a 365-day year, this statistic equates to approximately 1.7 million passengers per 
day transiting through America’s primary commercial service airport complexes.  
2. Israel 
Israel’s primary commercial service airports are managed by the national 
government through a public corporation known and identified as the Israel Airports 
Authority (IAA). This political subdivision54 of the state was established in 1977 and 
exists as the legal entity by which Israel’s airports are governed. Airports Council 
                                                 
54 A “political subdivision” is defined as a local government created by the states to help fulfill their 
obligations. Political subdivisions include counties, cities, towns, villages, and special districts such as 
school districts, water districts, park districts, and airport districts (High Beam Research, 2010).   
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International55(2010) notes that the IAA operates a total of seven airports across the 
country, specifically: Ben Gurion International Airport, Eilat International Airport, Haifa 
Airport, Herzlia Airport, Jerusalem/Atarot Airport, Rosh Mahanaim Airport, and Tel-
Aviv/Sde-Dov Hoz Airport. Of these seven as noted, only two, Ben Gurion International 
and Eilat International Airports (ETH), provide passenger services for international 
travelers. Of these two international aviation facilities, Ben Gurion International Airport 
(TLV), located southeast of Tel Aviv and near the city of Lod, is by far the busiest Israeli 
aviation facility with respect to overall international passenger traffic.  More particularly, 
the IAA database denotes that approximately 11.5 million passengers transited through 
TLV during calendar year 2008 (Israel Airports Authority, 2010).   
3. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
Regulated by the British Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), the British Airports 
Authority (BAA) operates six commercial service airports in the U.K. These airport 
facilities are identified by BAA as: Heathrow, Stansted, Glasgow, Edinburgh, Aberdeen, 
and Southampton Airports; however, Heathrow, which is located in the London 
metropolitan area, is by far the busiest airport in the UK logging approximately 65.9 
million passengers in calendar year 2009 alone (British Airports Authority, 2010). 
Finally, the CAA reports total U.K. passenger enplanements numbered approximately 
218.126 million passengers during the same reporting period (British Civil Aviation 
Authority, 2010).  
4. Commonwealth of Australia 
Australia’s primary commercial service airports are regulated by the Australian 
Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) along with the Australian Department of 
Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government (DOI). For 
aviation security matters, according to CASA, the DOI exercises sole regulatory 
responsibility for all security controlled airports in Australia. Similar to the airport 
                                                 
55 Airports Council International is an aviation industry trade organization that represents the world’s 
airports in matters regarding business, safety, security, and other regulatory affairs (Airports Council 
International, 2010).    
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classification scheme of U.S. Category X airports, the CASA website also reports that the 
Australian government designates its large international aviation facilities as “major 
international” airports, of which there are seven, specifically: Adelaide, Brisbane, Cairns, 
Darwin, Melbourne, Perth, and Sydney (Australian Civil Aviation Safety Authority, 
2010). 
For calendar year 2009, the DOI reports that a total of approximately 23.4 million 
international passengers, or approximately 2.0 million per month, transited through 
Australia’s major international airport complexes (Australian Department of 
Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Regional Government, 2010). 
Overall, however, the DOI reports a total of approximately 101 million passengers 
utilized Australian commercial aviation services for the 2008–2009 reporting period, with 
Sydney and Melbourne Airports ranking first and second with 22.7 million passengers 
and 20.0 million passengers, respectively (Australian Department of Infrastructure, 
Transport, Regional Development and Regional Government, 2010).    
D. FOREIGN SECURITY PERSPECTIVES 
1. Israeli Aviation Security: Major Themes 
In his 2003 Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute journal article 
entitled Strategies for Countering Terrorism: Lessons from the Israeli Experience, Dr. 
Jonathan B. Tucker, a senior fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace in Washington, D.C., 
identifies the five basic principles of Israeli counterterrorism strategy, specifically:  
1. Intelligence collection and analysis;  
2. Military and paramilitary operations to disrupt terrorist infrastructure;  
3. Commercial aviation security;  
4. Defense against chemical and biological agents; and,  
5. Efforts to strengthen the psychological endurance of the civilian 




All five of these elements possess general utility within the international aviation 
security sphere; however, the fundamental Israeli perspectives on intelligence collection 
and analysis, as well as commercial aviation security, retain particular relevance for U.S. 
aviation security practitioners.  
This is particularly true since Israeli counterterrorism strategy is characterized by 
an open flow of intelligence sharing within the aviation domain, which is then 
supplemented at state aviation facilities via the robust utilization of human observation 
and interaction of passengers by the IAA. In sum, the Israeli model of aviation security 
centers upon interdicting the individuals who intend to commit an act of terrorism within 
the aviation domain, and not in detection of offensive weapons that may be concealed and 
transported into aviation facilities or otherwise smuggled aboard aircraft.    
a. Intelligence Collection and Analysis  
Citing Israeli General Meir Dagan, Tucker (2003) posits that “The first 
priority [to combating terrorism] must be placed on intelligence, then on counterterrorism 
operations, and finally on defense and protection” (p. 3).  According to the official 
website of the Israel Security Agency (ISA), the country’s domestic intelligence service, 
which is also known as Shin Bet, works closely with the Israeli Defense Force, the 
Mossad, and the Israeli police to protect the state from threats of terror, espionage, 
sabotage, subversion, and the disclosure of state secrets (Israel Security Agency, 2010a). 
In order to accomplish this mission, the ISA utilizes “sophisticated technological 
resources” and methodologies in both human and technical collection to acquire threat 
assessment information (Israel Security Agency, 2010b). But, unlike the USA’s 
intelligence community, the ISA concentrates its agency’s efforts within the realm of 
human intelligence collection (Tucker, 2003, p. 3). Intelligence products published from 
the ISA are also shared with the IAA for the defense of Israeli aviation facilities.  
Rafi Ron, a former chief of IAA security operations from 1996–2001, 
testified before the U.S. Congress that that in order for an attack on an aircraft to be 
launched two pre-conditions must be in existence: 1) “There has to be a person with 
hostile intentions,” and 2) “A weapon must be used” (Ron, 2002).  Within the text of this 
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same testimony, Ron goes on to explain that explosive materials and devices have 
evolved to the extent that it is oftentimes difficult to screen both individuals and baggage 
for dangerous contraband with 100 percent success. According to Ron, this is due to the 
fact that these materials are easily concealed in an artful fashion and thus may be passed 
through technological screening devices undetected. As a consequence, the IAA, much 
like the ISA save and except for the duty to recruit human sources for intelligence 
operations, focuses the bulk of its aviation security resources on human observation and 
interaction, also known as human profiling, in conjunction with the use of threat 
assessment information to determine whether or not an individual is either a high- or low-
risk passenger.  
b. Human Observation and Interaction 
Ron’s February 27, 2002 Congressional statement characterizes the Israeli 
method of human assessment as a “systematic, real time” means of discerning the level of 
risk a given individual poses to aviation security. This model of human observation and 
interaction is based upon two general components. First, human interaction is predicated 
upon an individual’s age, ethnicity, birthplace, and religion, amongst other unidentified 
factors, that are automatically factored into a risk profile of a passenger prior to reaching 
an airport ticketing counter (Tucker, 2003, p. 6). At this point in time, dependent upon the 
profile, an interview may be conducted with a potential high-risk passenger at this outer 
layer of the IAA’s protective envelope inside the airport environment. Once at check-in, 
however, all passengers are interviewed with a series of questions, the specific purpose of 
which is to elicit information regarding the passenger’s reason(s) for travel as well as the 
particular contents of their baggage. Changes in narrative and or behavior are observed 
and any anomalies are noted for further consideration and investigation.  
Second, if cleared from the ticketing counter to proceed toward an aircraft 
loading area, all passengers are continuously observed throughout their ingress, or 
penetration, into the airport environment. Throughout this continuous observation 
process, Tucker (2003) notes that individuals are selectively engaged by security 
personnel for an interview at some point in time prior to actually boarding an aircraft (p. 
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6). These subsequent brief investigatory interviews are based upon anomalous behavioral 
traits that may be detected by the security staff. These interviews reportedly last “90 
seconds” to as long as “20 minutes,” according to Ron’s Congressional statement, and are 
supplemented as necessary with baggage searches that may involve testing at the 
“forensic level” for passengers subsequently identified as threats to the aviation domain 
(2002).   
2. UK Aviation Security: Major Themes  
In 2002, the British government appointed the Right Honorable Sir John 
Wheeler56 to conduct a review aviation security in the U.K. and report his findings. In 
2003, Wheeler submitted his conclusions and recommendations in a work product 
entitled, Report of Airport Security. In 2005, Wheeler conducted similar research for the 
Commonwealth of Australia and subsequently produced a report entitled, An Independent 
Review of Airport Security and Policing for the Government of Australia (Wheeler 
Review). The Wheeler Review incorporates many of the same recommendations and 
conclusions as the former 2003 Report on Airport Security.   
As such, in the 2005 Wheeler Review, the author notes that the “three essential 
security pillars [of] policy, operations and capability development” are critical to 
improved aviation security (Wheeler, 2005, p. 130). Accordingly, the U.K. has achieved 
a particularly high level of competence in the areas of integration and utilization of closed 
captioned television (CCTV) and interagency cooperation. The elements of interagency 
collaboration and cooperation are also evidenced by the U.K.’s development and use of 
the multi-agency threat and risk assessment (MATRA) methodology; the gold, silver, and 
bronze system of transit police command and control, as well as development of an 
overarching counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST).  
Before discussing the specific elements of each of these U.K. programs, however, 
it is helpful to understand that CONTEST is a national counterterrorism strategy in the 
U.K., the likes of which do not exist within any U.S. federal agency, inclusive of either 
                                                 
56 The Right Honorable Sir John Wheeler is a British citizen and politician who served in the Cabinet 
of the UK Prime Minister, The Right Honorable Sir John Major (Debrett’s, 2010).  
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the FBI or DHS-TSA. As a U.K. national strategy, then, CONTEST is divided into four 
principal areas of concentration  (U.K. Office of the Home Secretary, 2010):  
1. Pursue: to stop terrorist attacks. 
2. Prevent: to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting violent 
extremism. 
3. Protect: to strengthen our protection against terrorist attack. 
4. Prepare: where and attack cannot be stopped, to mitigate its impact.   
a. CCTV 
According to the U.K.’s Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology 
publication Postnote, CCTV is used for four principal reasons: 1) to monitoring public 
areas to identify suspicious events and subsequently direct security responses; 2) to 
record events for evidentiary purposes; 3) to engage in directed surveillance against 
suspected offenders; and 4) to serve as a deterrent against unwanted activities, 
particularly those involving criminal acts (United Kingdom Parliamentary Office of 
Science and Technology, 2002, p. 1). To accomplish these objectives, UK CCTV control 
rooms are designed with advanced digital technologies that alert operators to anomalous 
situations57 within certain CCTV-monitored environments, as well as pre-identified 
vehicle registration numbers, thus improving overall efficiency by reducing the necessity 
of CCTV operators to constantly monitor all cameras integrated into a particular CCTV 
system. Furthermore, by properly training CCTV operators in the use and appropriate 
documentation of recorded events, CCTV operational personnel are able to help identify 
regular patterns in both passenger and vehicular traffic, as well as identify anomalies 
within high-risk areas vulnerable to exploitation and attack. As such, regular surveillance 
and documentation via CCTV monitoring assists U.K. security authorities in identifying, 
interceding into, and ultimately disrupting acts such as the pre-operational surveillance of 
an enemy prior to an attack.      
                                                 
57 An “anomalous situation” may, for example, be a piece of luggage left unattended in the public area 
of an airport. As such, algorithms may be developed for use with CCTV equipment that may automatically 
sense and alarm at such events so that explosive detection teams and or bomb technicians may be 
dispatched to inspect and resolve the threat prior to a potential detonation.  
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b. Interagency Cooperation 
Interagency cooperation and improved aviation security are characterized 
in the UK through both the MATRA threat assessment system as well as the counter-
terrorism strategy CONTEST. Specific details on the MATRA system will be discussed 
at length later in this chapter. However, as this risk assessment system generally 
encourages collaboration, communication and coordination amongst aviation security 
personnel, the Rt. Hon. Sir John Wheeler is quoted in the 2005 review as stating: “The 
[MATRA] model encourages a culture of cooperation through sharing information, 
meetings, strong leadership, and linkages with other airport committees (where MATRA 
groups are meant to be strategic, other groups tend to be operational). It is, in short, an 
all-way communication process” (Wheeler, 2005, p. 124). 
Interagency cooperation and communication is further characterized in the 
U.K. by the deployment of specialized police personnel within the aviation domain. 
Known and referred to as the Aviation Security Operational Command Unit (SO18), a 
component of the London Metropolitan Police Special Branch Division, officers assigned 
to this detail are highly-trained in counterterrorism policing tactics. Similar to the 
numerically smaller contingent of FBI Airport Liaison Agents in the U.S., officers 
attached to SO18 focus on working with both airport security operators as well as the 
U.K.’s intelligence resources to ensure the security of London’s airport facilities.      
3. Commonwealth of Australia Aviation Security: Major Themes 
As identified by the 2005 Wheeler Review, the system of aviation security in 
Australia is characterized by three principal themes that may be relevant to U.S. aviation 
security enhancements, specifically: 1) Airport Security Command Structure; 2) 
Intelligence Sharing; and 3) Threat Analysis (Wheeler, 2005). Each of these fundamental 
elements will be individually examined within the context of the Australian aviation 
security environment as identified in the 2005 Review.  
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a. Airport Security Command Structure 
The 2005 Review identified “command and control” of aviation police and 
security forces at Australian airports as a substantial impediment to achieving an 
enhanced national security posture within the air domain (Wheeler). Moreover, the 2005 
Review noted that there was neither consistency in unity of command, control, 
communications, nor central police leadership at any given Australian aviation facility 
(Wheeler). As a result, the 2005 Review recommends an inter-jurisdictional approach to 
forming Australian aviation police contingents. Specifically, the 2005 Review suggests 
placing a federal police commander at each major airport in Australia, and then rounding 
out that force with police officers from state and territorial police agencies. The exact 
compliment of each police force, according to the 2005 Review, is dependent upon the 
geographical size/location/transient population of the airport, along with other factors 
highlighted by the joint threat assessment analysis for each airport facility considered. 
b. Intelligence Sharing 
The 2005 Review notes that “intelligence [information] is the first line of 
defense against terrorism and crime at airports” (Wheeler, p. 52). Despite this fact, the 
2005 Review also cites that cultural issues regarding threat assessment information 
dissemination has been hampered at Australian airports such that fact-based decisions, 
which are facilitated by intelligence products distributed to aviation security decision 
makers, are oftentimes unavailable (Wheeler). Accordingly, Australian aviation police 
and security practitioners are left to function in a reactionary mode as opposed to fielding 
a more proactive security posture. In sum, the 2005 Review concludes that threat 
assessment information “. . . should be shared rather than sequestered, used rather than 
filed away” with and by those individuals who possess both the authority and 
responsibility to ensure the security of Australian aviation facilities (Wheeler, p. 87). 
The remedy to this dilemma in Australia has been to proffer a two-fold 
response: 1) alter legislation as necessary to facilitate the dissemination of threat 
assessment information to appropriately cleared airport security operators; and 2) to  
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charge the Australian Security Intelligence Organization with the legal responsibility to 
pass intelligence products to airport security officials so that it may assess the 
information relative to the threat environment that then exists. 
c. Threat Analysis 
The system of threat analysis in the Australian Aeronautical Domain is 
adapted from the U.K.’s Multi-Agency Threat and Risk Assessment (MATRA) 
methodology. Developed and tested in the U.K. after the initial 2002 Wheeler Report on 
Airport Security, the MATRA methodology recognizes that size, location, physical 
composition, and other general characteristics of the threat environment for individual 
aviation facilities will present different threats, vulnerabilities and contingent risks for 
each location assessed. As such, MATRA promotes an interdisciplinary approach to 
conducting aviation threat assessments by enlisting the involvement of various police, 
security, and private stakeholders at each facility to compose a threat assessment team. 
Approaching the aviation threat assessment in this manner, according to the Wheeler 
2005 Review, will encourage a jointly owned work product that can be supported by all 
parties.  
There are four main components of the MATRA system. First, a general 
threat assessment is conducted that identifies all of the probable threat streams, along 
with the potential consequences of each, that are most likely to be encountered at an 
individual airport. Second, a vulnerability assessment is conducted to determine which 
particular assets at a given aviation facility may be at the greatest risk to the potential 
attack scenarios considered. Third, a comparison of the threats and vulnerabilities is 
conducted to discern the overall real or residual risks that exist within the facility 
assessed. And fourth, an action plan is developed by the joint committee to determine 
which countermeasures are necessary in order to sufficiently mitigate the residual risks 
identified.  
Finally, the Australian MATRA system is monitored by the national 
government at individual airports across the Commonwealth. This is a significant  
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difference from the current aviation security system in the U.S. where there is no federal 
mandate to incorporate a consistent, recurrent and systematic plan for assessing 
individual threat(s) and risk(s) at commercial-use aviation facilities. 
E. DISCUSSION & RECOMMENDATIONS 
While none of the foreign aviation security partners assessed in this research 
totally discard the appropriate use of advanced physical screening technologies within the 
air domain to locate weapons and other dangerous materials, it is apparent that Israel, the 
U.K. and Australia all tend to focus more proactively within two principal areas: 1) 
engaging in multi-agency collaboration and coordination amongst security partners; and 
2) a prevailing focus on identifying dangerous people, not dangerous belongings. To 
achieve the ultimate goal of aviation security, then, these countries engage in the 
following key security activities: 
• Israel: robust intelligence gathering and sharing of the same information 
with aviation security partners of travelers prior to their arrival at an 
airport facility; physical observation of airport travelers once they have 
arrived at an airport facility; and finally, face-to-face engagement of 
passengers through interviews prior to boarding a departing flight. 
• UK:  robust intelligence gathering and sharing of the same information 
with aviation security partners—those security partners being Special 
Branch police officers who have been specifically trained in the U.K.’s 
national counterterrorism doctrine—of travelers prior to their arrival at an 
airport facility, which in the case of the U.K. is characterized by the use of 
enhanced CCTV systems; command and control of police/security 
resources as noted through the gold, silver and bronze system,58 along 
with the CONTEST national strategy; and finally, the incorporation of a 
joint threat assessment methodology (MATRA) for each commercial 
airport within the U.K.’s jurisdiction.        
• Australia:  robust intelligence gathering and sharing of the same 
information with aviation security partners of travelers prior to their 
arrival at an airport facility; utilization of a coordinated system of 
                                                 
58 The reference to the “Gold, Silver and Bronze” system of managing UK police forces is made 
simply to demonstrate that the various components of the UK system of law enforcement work in concert 
with one another in a structure and coordinated manner, under a common antiterrorism doctrine, in order to 
better secure the United Kingdom. Considering that the U.S. hosts a plethora of policing agencies at all 
levels, the suggestion here is simply that U.S. law enforcement/aviation security organizations should 
consider adopting a similar coordinated approach to sharing information and resources to better secure the 
U.S. NAD.     
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police/security command and control at the federal, provincial and local 
levels. Finally, the incorporation of a joint threat assessment methodology 
(MATRA) for each commercial airport within Australia’s jurisdiction.  
Compared to the current overall system of aviation security, all of the practices 
outlined above possess a great deal of promise for the U.S. aviation security industry. 
Consequently, generally speaking, the U.S. should consider adoption of a more 
collaborative approach to aviation security with an overall shift in focus to identifying 
potentially dangerous people, not just weapons alone. More demonstrative of the notion 
of success with respect to the foreign security practices identified, however, is the 
recurring themes of police/security/intelligence service cooperation and coordination—
themes that are evidenced in the works cited herein.   
Moreover, while legal, logistical, political, and cost constraints may prohibit 
practices such as the Israeli method of interviewing all passengers prior to boarding, or 
the Australian practice of meshing all police/security forces at U.S. airport facilities, 
some modified form of these methodologies may be attainable domestically. For 
example, the U.K.’s use of digitally based CCTV surveillance may provide a force 
multiplying effect for U.S. aviation security operators that facilitates the Israeli 
methodology of enhanced human observation while only permitting engagement of 
passengers who demonstrate some behavioral anomaly indicative of a threat.  
The recurring theme of intelligence gathering and sharing amongst the foreign 
partners examined herein is, in fact, a smart practice for U.S. practitioners and is further 
supported by the U.S. 9/11 Commission Report. Likewise, Australia’s and the U.K.’s use 
of the MATRA system of consistent and recurrent threat assessments is promising and is 
widely discussed within U.S. aviation security circles, but unfortunately the specific 
practice of conducting comprehensive threat assessments at domestic aviation facilities 
within the U.S. has not come to fruition at this time. Overall, however, none of the 
practices outlined herein would be cost prohibitive to either the U.S. government or 
domestic airport security operators because, in large part, all of the practices outlined 
chiefly involve changes in governmental policy and culture, and do not entail the large 
capital outlay or investment of expensive infrastructure. One potential exception, 
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however, may be in cases where the addition/rehabilitation of CCTV systems is 
necessary due to either a poor design/deployment strategy, or because the age and 
technological capability of the current equipment is inadequate.      
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have fueled a near decade-long debate 
regarding how best to ensure the future security of the U.S. National Aeronautical 
Domain. Traditionally within the U.S. aviation security sector, emphasis has been placed 
upon detecting offense weapons, such as firearms and explosive devices, by the use of 
screening technology. In a post-9/11 aviation threat environment, the U.S. government 
has generally maintained the same philosophical approach, specifically: utilize advanced 
technology to locate the physical implements, or tools, of terrorism prior to their 
introduction onto a commercial aircraft. Accordingly, with the advancement of explosive 
trace detection equipment, more sophisticated imaging technologies, as well as the 
deployment of additional explosive ordinance detection canine teams across the U.S., this 
trend has continued domestically with little variation.  
Conversely, other countries faced with the same challenges to secure their 
respective aeronautical domains have instituted programs, policies, and technological 
infrastructure to supplement their post-9/11 security posture, but with one fundamental 
philosophical variance, that is: focus on locating, identifying and neutralizing dangerous 
people—not necessarily the weapons that might be utilized to facilitate an attack—prior 
to the dangerous person’s introduction onto a commercial aircraft. As such, this thesis 
chapter seeks to explore the theoretical and operational security focuses of three different 
democratically governed countries—Israel, the U.K. and Australia—to determine the 
potential efficacy of those countries’ respective aviation security methodologies for 
possible inclusion into the U.S. aviation security strategy. 
In brief summary, while the major theme in U.S. aviation security continues to be 
a focus on the identification of dangerous weapons, which, to be sure, is an extremely 
important aspect of aviation security, Israel has maintained its long-established center of 
interest in profiling dangerous people prior to their arrival at aviation facilities. 
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Specifically, by the utilization of both intelligence resources and thereafter within the 
geographical footprint of the airport by physical observation and face-to-face interviews 
with travelers, Israeli aviation security forces have produced a long and impressive record 
of aviation security success. Likewise, Australia has implemented an enhanced aviation 
intelligence apparatus and threat assessment process that supplements an inter-
jurisdictional police service to maintain its defense of national aviation resources. And 
finally, the UK has implemented the advanced use of digitally-based closed captioned 
television systems, supplemented by appropriate policies and interagency cooperation, to 
deter, identify, interdict, and, as necessary, respond to suspicious individuals within the 
aviation domain. To be sure, within certain legal as well as logistical limitations,59 all of 
the security methodologies utilized by these foreign aviation security partners could 
prove useful within the U.S. aeronautical domain.  
Further research in this area is certainly recommended, which is a point that will 
be noted within the conclusion chapter of this thesis.     
 
                                                 
59 Note the introductory facts cited early in this chapter regarding variances in each country’s aviation 
domain size, scope, and transient populations, all of which are factors that may ultimately inhibit the 
incorporation of the exact methodologies utilized in each country analyzed. Legal constraints may also 
impact implementation of these factors from country-to-country as well.  
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VI. CREATING AN INTELLIGENCE-LED, RISK-BASED 
AVIATION SECURITY MEGACOMMUNITY60 
Leadership and organizational structures must support and reward 
innovations in community partnership and problem solving. (Peed, 2008) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Sir Robert Peel,61 oftentimes referred to as the “father of modern policing,” 
understood that effective partnerships with all facets of a community were necessary in 
order to ensure public safety. Similarly, in order to adequately defend the United States 
against future attacks within the homeland, particularly with in the aviation domain, the 
tasks of integrating intelligence-based threat assessment information with risk-based 
operational planning and decision-making will require great effort, coordination, and 
collaboration from the police, security groups, and the public alike. This will certainly not 
be an easy task, especially given the traditional law enforcement/security subcultures that 
rightly place a great deal of value into secrecy for operational security purposes. As such, 
a specific organizational construct should be adopted within the aviation security industry 
that facilitates and supports a logical migration into a more open, communicative, and 
participative environment. Accordingly, the commercial aviation industry must seek and 
implement remedies to these problems before another national catastrophe occurs.  
The December 25, 2009 attack (12/25 attack) of a commercial aircraft in Detroit, 
Michigan demonstrates two critical issues: 1) that the U.S. Aeronautical Domain is still 
considered a high-value target for terrorist factions; and 2) that but for good fortune, the 
12/25 attack referenced above would have been successful—especially given the missed 
                                                 
60 A “megacommunity” is defined by Gerencser, Lee, Napolitano, and Kelly (2008) as “a 
collaborative socioeconomic environment in which business, government, and civil society interact 
according to their common interests, while maintaining their unique priorities” (p. 232).  
61 Sir Robert Peel (1788-1850) was a British politician and prime minister and is considered the 
“father of modern policing” because of reforms he instituted within England’s police force in1829. These 
reforms are characterized, in part, by Peel’s acknowledgement that the police and a state’s citizens must 
form a community partnership in order to ensure public safety (Answers.com, 2010).  
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intelligence opportunities revealed in the post-event investigation.62 As such, there is still 
much to be accomplished in order to better secure the national air transportation network. 
Since the reliance upon good luck is not a viable anti-terrorism strategy for the United 
States, the future physical and financial security of the U.S. Aeronautical Domain will 
rest largely upon the willingness and abilities of the actors within the sector to connect 
together for a common purpose. To this end, a significant paradigm shift in aviation 
security strategy must first occur with respect to intelligence sharing and critical 
infrastructure protection within the domain. More specifically, all of the stakeholders 
within the U.S. aviation industry must join together and engage each other as a 
community with a common cause—that cause being the continuous improvement and 
evolution of aviation security in advance of developing threat streams to the sector.  
Accordingly, those working in and otherwise utilizing domestic air transportation 
services must become a community—an aviation security megacommunity—truly 
devoted to the protection of the people and the critical assets that constitute the American 
aviation transportation network. Thus, in order to achieve the goal of becoming an 
effective aviation security mega-group, many lessons in strategic community engagement 
should first be gleaned from the guiding principles established in an assortment of 
business management publications available today.  
B. BORROWED PERCEPTIONS ON COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT FROM 
THE BUSINESS SECTOR 
In the publication Megacommunities, Gerencser, Lee, Napolitano, and Kelly 
(2008) note, “Megacommunities are not large communities of people; they are 
communities of organizations whose leaders and members have deliberately come 
together across national, organizational, and sectoral boundaries to reach the goals they 
cannot achieve alone” (p. 28). Furthermore, within these megacommunities described by 
the authors, Gerencser et al. (2008) also introduce the notion of “tri-sector” collaboration, 
                                                 
62 See, for example, the White House Review Summary Regarding the 12/25/2009 Attempted Terrorist 
Attack wherein federal investigators found that sufficient threat assessment information existed within the 
Intelligence Community (IC) to thwart Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab’s attack, yet the IC failed to share the 
information within the broader intelligence “megacommunity” such that the dots could be connected to 
ultimately prevent the attack (White House, 2010). 
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which is the understanding by leaders that three indispensible groups - composed of 
private, public and civil sectors -actually comprise the overall population that constitutes 
the “megacommunity” (pp. 194–197). As the idea of megacommunity engagement relates 
to air domain security, the general theory encompasses great utility because, as already 
noted in this research project, U.S. Category X airport facilities represent very large and 
diverse communal populations. Typically employing anywhere from 25,000–45,000 
public and private sector workers at each facility63, as well as transporting millions of 
passengers (civil sector representatives) annually at each of the nation’s largest 27 
commercial service airport complexes, Category X aviation facilities serve as a prime 
example of a potential security megacommunity—one rich in potential intelligence 
gathering/sharing capabilities due to the inherent overlap in vital interests, structure and 
convergence of the air transportation industry. The vital security interest of the domestic 
aviation industry is, or should be, the ultimate goal of providing for the safe, efficient, 
and unimpeded movement of people and commerce across the United States. Finally, if 
one considers that all Category X airports are linked into a national air service network, 
then the potential aviation security megacommunity’s population grows exponentially . . . 
provided, of course, an effective strategy is utilized to first build the megacommunity’s 
security system.  
The strategic elements necessary to build a national aviation security 
megacommunity—one that seeks to collect and disseminate threat assessment 
information and protect the critical infrastructure that ultimately supports the industry—
may be found in the work, Blue Ocean Strategy (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005).  In this 
publication, Kim and Mauborgne (2005) note that there are three characteristics of a good 
strategy, specifically: 1) focus; 2) divergence; and 3) a Compelling Tag Line (p. 39). In 
the context of aviation, then, the term “focus” relates to centering the aviation 
megacommunity’s attention on security-related matters, conveying the understanding that 
everyone is responsible for contributing to the security effort. The term “divergence” 
relates to a departure from the status quo and aviation’s predominant reliance upon 
                                                 
63 This estimation is predicated upon this researcher’s personal knowledge of the Houston Airport 
System’s credentialed employee population.  
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standard TSA baseline security measures to ensure air domain safety, and the emerging 
“tagline” should emanate from the national megacommunity’s interdependence upon one 
another to produce a more proactive intelligence-led, risk-based security strategy. While 
the idea of actively gathering and sharing threat assessment information within aviation is 
not new, in practice the concept is only a good theory. In fact, some aviation security 
practitioners within the industry and law enforcement arenas would label the idea of 
widespread collaboration and threat assessment information sharing as foolish and 
unwise based upon, for example, the traditionally inflexible “need to know” standard of 
sharing intelligence information.       
To the contrary, however, in their publication The Starfish and the Spider, 
Brafman and Becktrom (2006) postulate that rigid, orderly and hierarchal solutions 
oftentimes stifle creativity and innovation (p. 203).64 Consequently, in today’s 
asymmetrical aviation threat environment where terrorist organizations and individual 
perpetrators are more decentralized and creative, and in fact are leaderless in more and 
more instances, a more participative, evolutionary, and novel security strategy is 
necessary. Accordingly, including and leveraging the collective knowledge and ideas of 
all of the members within the aviation megacommunity, inclusive of non-traditional 
security partners such as ramp agents, ticket agents, janitorial staff, and airline mechanics 
in the protective services process, the National Aeronautical Domain as a whole will 
become safer and more resilient because these non-traditional partners may: 1) provide 
insight into vulnerabilities previously not considered by traditional security/police 
assessors; 2) provide insight into what types of countermeasures may be most effective in 
the protection of aviation critical infrastructure and key resources; and 3) by practicing 
inclusion, provide a forum by which to convey previously untapped intelligence sources 
for security/police groups whose principal responsibility is the protection of the air 
domain. This more organic, non-typical, decentralized approach to aviation security is 
exactly the type of strategy necessary in order to combat adversaries to the domain who 
                                                 
64 As the limitations of rigid, hierarchal decision-making are considered in The Starfish and the 
Spider, one may draw an analogous reference to the  911 Commission Report’s conclusion that the 
bureaucracy of the U.S. government failed “in imagination, policy, capabilities, and management” (9/11 
Commission Report, 2004, p. 339).     
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are likewise creative, increasingly decentralized and innovative in their own regard. But 
establishing trust amongst those within the aeronautical industry, although a daunting and 
long-term task, will ultimately be a critical enabler in achieving an all-inclusive, robust 
and effective intelligence-led, risk-based national aviation security strategy.  
Covey and Merrill (2006) denote in The Speed of Trust that “trust impacts us 
24/7, 365 days a year. It undergirds and affects the quality of every relationship, every 
communication, every work project, every business venture, every effort in which we are 
engaged” (pp. 1–2). Unfortunately, however, even within the post-9/11 aviation security 
industry, the vital element of trust has neither been widely extended nor leveraged outside 
of the formal hierarchy of law enforcement and security circles in the pursuit of air 
domain security. While regrettable, this condition is understandable due to the inherent 
nature of distrust extant within most security/police subcultures toward anyone else 
outside of those closely associated fields of work; trust is also difficult to establish 
between air carriers who are, understandably, very protective of their corporate 
information within an intensely competitive, capitalistic marketplace.   
Consequently, before a paradigm shift may occur to inculcate an intelligence-led, 
risk-based security strategy utilizing the strategic principles found in Megacommunities 
(Gerencser, et al., 2008), Blue Ocean Strategy (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005), or the flexible 
Spider and the Starfish (Brafman and Becktrom, 2006) -type organizations, change 
agents must begin extending “smart trust” (Covey & Merrill, 2006, p. 287). Smart trust, 
according Covey and Merrill, is an area of trust found on a “smart trust matrix” between 
distrust/suspicion and blind trust/gullibility (p. 288), and it is exactly this type of trust 
that must be extended to the hundreds-of-thousands aviation workers heretofore not 
actively engaged in the aviation security process nationwide. As such, aviation security 
groups across the nation, in partnership with the law enforcement and DHS elements 
extant within the sector, are in the best position to begin building a national security 
network—and in due course recruit other members into the aviation security 
megacommunity from both aviation business and private citizens. Within this paradigm 
shift of better communication, coordination, and collaboration, overcoming the traditional 
turf wars and trust issues inherent within the intelligence community may be overcome 
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within the NAD by: 1) the identification of a specific inter-jurisdictional work plan, and 
2) practicing the elements of trust and engagement previously cited herein.    
As a consequence, an intelligence-led, risk-based strategy that endeavors to 
incorporate the elements of trust and community engagement are necessary to effectively 
evolve and thwart emerging threat streams to the air domain. Fortunately by reaching out 
to the millions of Americans working in and otherwise utilizing the national aviation 
transportation network, and with the inculcation of widespread trust within this 
megacommunity, a flexible, adaptive, and more robust security community may be 
developed that will effectively and pragmatically evolve to better secure this nation’s 
critical aviation infrastructure and key aviation resources. 
Considered in this context, then, the nation’s overall aviation security posture may 
be improved in a post-9/11 environment by incorporating a policing/security 
methodology within the domain that endorses the concepts of cooperation, community 
engagement, communication, and collaboration—in conjunction with intelligence-based 
threat assessment information as discussed in Chapters III and IV of this thesis. 
Accordingly, a contemporary policing strategy known as intelligence-led policing may 
provide the necessary organizational model to affect such as result.   
The past 150 years of American policing has seen many eras, each of which has 
been characterized by the dominant policing strategy in place at the time. In fact, Kelling 
and Moore (1988) define three distinct periods of American policing, specifically: “the 
political, the reform and the community problem solving” eras (p. 2). Within the 
community era of policing defined by Kelling and Moore (1988), Ratcliffe (2008) 
identifies five distinct variations, or common models, of policing in the United States: 1) 
standard model of policing; 2) community policing; 3) problem-oriented policing; 4) 
Compstat; and 5) intelligence-led policing (p. 65).   
The most current evolutional model of policing in the United States, intelligence-
led policing, is based upon the strategic level and has linkages to all of the policing 
models cited hereinabove (Ratcliffe, 2008, p. 6). Moreover, Ratcliffe (2008) defines 
intelligence-led policing as a concept or “business model and managerial philosophy 
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where data analysis and crime intelligence are pivotal to an objective, decision-making 
framework that facilitates crime and problem reduction, disruption, and prevention 
through both strategic management and effective strategies that target prolific and serious 
offenders” (p. 6). Consequently, as the theory of intelligence-led policing may relate to 
improving the U.S. aviation security enterprise, Ratcliffe (2008) postulates that the 
concept of intelligence-led policing “is theoretically possible . . . without involving the 
traditional public police force” and “is now being widely offered by institutions other 
than the state, including private companies and community volunteers” (p. 7). 
Finally, in considering all of the data available and whether or not an adaptation 
of intelligence-led policing should be implemented throughout the NAD, Ratcliffe points 
to the following key elements that, if properly implemented and managed, further support 
utilization of the model (2008, pp. 235–6):  
1. There is a supportive and informed command structure; 
2. Intelligence-led policing is the heart of an organization-wide approach; 
3. Crime and criminal analysis is integrated; 
4. The focus is on prolific and serious offenders; 
5. Analytical and executive training is available; 
6. Both strategic and tactical tasking meetings take place; 
7. Much routine investigation is screened out; 
8. Data are sufficiently complete, reliable and available to support products 
that influence decision-making; 
9. Management structures exist to action intelligence products; and,  
10. There is appropriate use of prevention, disruption and enforcement.   
Given the totality of the data presented herein, in conjunction with the identified 
needs to incorporate an intelligence- and risk-based security model within the NAD, the 
intelligence-led policing methodology deserves further discussion and consideration.         
C. INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING (ILP) 
At its core, ILP helps leaders make informed decisions to address agency 
priorities. These priorities can include issues such as crime prevention, 
crime reduction, case management, resource allocation, case clearance, 
anticipation of future threats, or crime problems. This process provides 
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guidance and support to the agency leader, regardless of the type of 
priority established (U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, 2009)  
Aviation security and law enforcement are two distinctly different work groups 
that operate, for the most part, in historically different work environments; however, both 
groups are charged with the duty to detect, deter, deny, delay, and respond to adversaries’ 
attempts to compromise the national air transportation network. Moreover, as established 
in Chapter V of this thesis, the acquisition and deployment of physical countermeasures 
remains the principal responsibility of aviation security groups, not law enforcement.  As 
such, the need to integrate threat assessment information into operations is critical to both 
domains if decisions regarding protective measures are to be predicated upon more than 
mere intuition. The concept of intelligence-led policing (ILP) may provide a 
methodological framework from which the U.S. civil aviation domain may adapt an 
intelligence-led aviation security megacommunity. For example, Carter (2004) defines 
ILP as “. . . an underlying philosophy of how intelligence fits into the operations of a law 
enforcement operation. Rather than being simply an information clearinghouse that has 
been appended to the organization, ILP provides strategic integration of intelligence into 
the overall mission of the organization” (p. 41). Furthermore, in support of the aviation 
security megacommunity theme, Carter (2009) denotes that “. . . ILP must be created 
through an inclusive developmental process to ensure that it is integrated with an 
agency’s goals and functions, its capabilities, and the characteristics of both the agency 
and the jurisdiction it serves” (p. 79). Given Carter’s definition of ILP along with this 
thesis’s pre-established nexus between the U.S. commercial aviation operator’s principal 
legal and operational responsibilities to protect the NAD at the infrastructure level (the 
nation’s Category X airport facilities), it appears that conceptually an adaptation of ILP 
within the NAD may serve to more efficiently and effectively deal with threats within the 
national aviation system—on both a local as well as a national level. How? 
Since the task of protecting a large U.S. Category X aviation facility involves, or 
should involve, as this thesis argues, decision-making relative to the deployment of both 
human and physical countermeasures on a recurrent basis dependent upon threat streams 
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in order to be most effective, those involved in apportioning scare security resources must 
adopt a common rationale, structure or security philosophy. Otherwise, a security 
management team’s “best guess” will be the only guiding principle for the rationing of 
protective assets. As such, an aviation security group must organize and avail itself to an 
organizational structure that seeks and requires the use of threat assessment information 
in the development and deployment of its overall security strategy. Ratliffe (2008) 
corroborates this point by stating that ILP:  
. . . is a business model and managerial philosophy where data analysis 
and crime intelligence are pivotal to an objective, decision-making 
framework that facilitates crime and problem reduction, disruption and 
prevention through both strategic management and effective enforcement 
strategies that target prolific and serious offenders” (p. 6).  
Accordingly, as applied within the realm of aviation security, one could slightly 
modify Ratliff’s definition to include intelligence-based information such as threat 
assessment data for a particular facility or region of the nation, and simply supplant the 
phrase “enforcement strategy” for “security strategy.”    
With regard to the implementation of ILP into an organization, Carter (2009) 
states that “out the outset, ILP should be viewed as a philosophy, not a process “(p. 86). 
Therefore, the integration of ILP into an organization is contingent upon: 1) an agency’s 
ability to create a threat assessment information network both inside and outside of its 
organization;65 and 2) creating an internal management structure that supports the ILP 
process (Carter, 2009, p. 86).66 Consequently, in addition to seeking access to computer-
based intelligence networks, such as the Homeland Secure Data Network and Secret 
Internet Protocol Router Network, an aviation security organization should endeavor to 
create relationships within the broader security megacommunity. This strategic 
community outreach should not only include aviation-centric security organizations, such 
                                                 
65 This key element of Carter’s ILP integration plan is directly related to the concept of an aviation 
security megacommunity heretofore discussed in this chapter.  
66 This element of Carter’s ILP integration plan is directly related to this thesis’s argument that 
aviation security groups should move beyond implementing just the standard TSA-mandated baseline 
security measures and endeavor to routinely utilize intelligence-based threat assessments to guide, adjust 
and supplement available protective resources for any given aviation facility.    
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as proprietary air carrier security groups and the Federal Air Marshal Service and TSA, 
but affiliations with the local police, FBI, ICE, and CBP elements that also operate within 
the region of the Category X airport to be protected. Furthermore, the aviation security 
megacommunity outreach, and network, should extend throughout the nation’s 27 TSA-
designated airport security coordinators representing all Category X airports within the 
United States.  
Moreover, with regard to implementation, there is not a specific model that all 
organizations should emulate in order to apply ILP within their agency. In fact, Carter 
(2009) notes:  
…there are tools that can be used to identify the intelligence needs of an 
agency and then craft the policies and processes to make ILP functional 
for each department . . . [because] essentially, intelligence is about 
managing information . . . that is needed to identify threats of concern to a 
community, and having sufficient information about the threat to develop 
operational responses to prevent or mitigate the threat” (p. 99).  
Consequently, Carter (2009) is urging the creation of two principal elements 
within any ILP-driven agency: 1) an overall management framework that accepts, 
inculcates and ultimately determines what the ILP process should be for any given 
protective agency; and 2) the inclusion of a trained intelligence analyst to collect, 
distinguish and advise the agency’s command hierarchy of the specific threat streams 
within the jurisdiction’s environment, or area of responsibility, that need to be addressed. 
Therefore, philosophically, an aviation security management group must first 
agree that intelligence-based information should form the foundation of their respective 
airport security plan beyond that which is required by TSA regulations. Thereafter, once 
both technical as well as human resources have been developed to routinely receive 
intelligence-based information, the operational application of this information should be 
introduced into the security group’s decision-making processes at all levels within the 
organization. For example, in normal circumstances this could occur on a weekly basis 
with the local security group meeting to discuss any intelligence-based information 
recently obtained and dependent upon the contingent risks identified by use of that 
information, security patrol beats to heighten visibility in certain areas could be adjusted, 
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or engagement in other security practices that may tend to disrupt an adversary’s 
planning cycle could be introduced into the environment to be protected.67   
In the event of a rapidly evolving threat, however, there is certainly nothing that 
prevents impromptu meetings to discuss potential response options vis-à-vis available 
resources. Moreover, with the occurrence of an immediate, time-sensitive threat, on-duty 
supervisory staff must retain the authority to control protective service resources and 
respond with agility to fast moving threat streams. This may be aided by the use of pre-
determined contingency plans for various events, but the central point here is that 
intelligence-based information should be available and utilized by all levels of 
membership within a protective services organization on a consistent, continuous basis. 
Finally, the chart below outlines the seven basic strategic priorities that security managers 
should consider when implementing a version of ILP into their organization.     
Table 3.   Seven Strategic Priorities that Should be Considered When Implementing 
ILP into an Organization (From Carter, 2009, p. 100) 
The Concept...  Asks the question…  Responsibility…  
Strategic Priority  What problems are important to me?  Executive  
Intelligence 
Requirements  
What additional information do I need 
to better understand each problem, its 
causes, and its effects?  
Executive, Commander, and 
Analyst  
Collection Plan  Where (sources) and how (methods) 
will I get the additional information that 
I need to better understand the problem? 
Commander and Analyst  
Analysis  Collectively, what does the new 
information mean and what new 
insights does it provide about the 
problem?  
Analyst with review by 
Supervisor  
                                                 
67 The number of security practices that may be adopted and altered on an ongoing basis is limited 
only by a security group’s collective imagination and the need to balance security operations with the least 
amount of disruption to routine flight operations at a Category X airport. This routine planning by the 
security group also includes other measures that may include planning and budgeting for major capital 
infrastructure improvements relative to security, such as the addition of closed captioned television 
coverage, and thereafter, the addition of a specially trained staff to monitor the environs for pattern of life 
anomalies, and so on. Nothing herein is meant to suggest, however, that quickly evolving threats must be 
addressed through a slow, bureaucratic process. Indeed, quick, agile response(s) are typically necessary in 
fast-paced, high-threat environments—such as in commercial aviation environments. Accordingly, this 
notation is made simply to remind the reader that intelligence-based information should form the basis of 
operational decisions—at all levels and regarding all threat conditions - whenever such information is 
available.     
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The Concept...  Asks the question…  Responsibility…  
Intelligence Products  What actionable information do I need 
to tell other people in order to prevent 
or control the problem?  
Analyst with Commander’s 
Advice  
Operational Responses  What explicit operational activities may 
be implemented to prevent or mitigate 
the priority problems? What resources 
are needed?  
Intelligence and Operations 
Commanders  
Process Review  From this process:  
• • Was the information accurate and 
useful?  
• • Could the problem be altered as a 
result of the information?  
• • What will make the process better?  
Did the operational response generate 
more local intelligence which should 
now be evaluated in connection with 
the threat?68   
 
Intelligence and Operations 
Commanders with Feedback 
to Executive 
D. CONCLUSION 
Effectively defending the United States from another attack within the National 
Aeronautical Domain will require a more participative, inclusive and collaborative effort 
from traditional security entities, the private sector and the citizenry who utilize 
commercial air transportation services. The routine and timely use of intelligence-based 
threat assessment information juxtaposed against a Category X aviation facility’s known 
security strengths and weaknesses is equally important for security groups to adjust the 
security posture of a particular facility in real time. Consequently, the adaptation of ILP 
into the aviation security domain on a national basis will naturally facilitate the merger of 
both intelligence-based threat information as well as formalized risk-assessment 
processes. As such, incorporated by an underpinning that recognizes the networked  
 
                                                 
68 This question was posed, and subsequently added to Table 3 after consultation with the thesis 
advisors reviewing this document. Thesis co-advisor Paul Smith suggests that “this is an example of the 
intelligence cycle in action,” and consequently should always be asked during the Process Review stage 
(Smith, 2010). 
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strength of a cross-functional group, a security megacommunity may emerge that will 
ultimately produce a more resilient, more flexible and, ultimately, a more secure national 
air transportation network.          
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VII. POLICY OPTIONS AND EVALUATION 
A. INTRODUCTION: RESTATEMENT OF PROBLEM 
As a critical component of the national infrastructure, the collective and sustained 
efforts of all levels of government, coupled along with collaboration from the private 
sector as well, must continue to bear upon the deterrence, detection and denial of future 
adversaries to the NAD. This fact is particularly true today since the enemies who 
attacked America on 9/11 remain committed to replicate the same type of catastrophic 
damage, death and destruction that the world witnessed on 9/11.69  
Indeed, despite the fact that advances in aviation security have been achieved 
since 9/11, such as the passage of the 2001 Aviation Transportation Security Act which 
created the TSA with a mandate to focus solely on national transportation security issues, 
impediments to optimizing the national aviation security enterprise still exist. As such, 
the foregoing chapters have attempted to explore the various key aspects of an effective 
local aviation security program—those elements which, if either instituted and or 
improved upon, may enhance air domain security even more across the United States. In 
so doing, this thesis discussed, among other factors:  
1. The routine utilization of threat assessment information for the local 
security manager in managing regional aviation security plans; 
2. The incorporation of a risk-based assessment methodology as a critical 
element in developing and refining local aviation security plans; and 
finally, 
3. The application of an adaptation of intelligence-led policing, an 
organizational management construct that incorporates or merges both 
threat assessment information along with a risk-based assessment 
methodology into a security enterprise’s philosophical and operational 
plans.  
                                                 
69 This supposition is further supported, for example, by: 1) Richard Reid’s 12/22/2001 “shoe bomb” 
attempt to destroy American Airlines Flight 63; 2) the August 2006 plot of al Qaeda operatives to destroy 
several U.S.-bound aircraft from Europe (re: UK’s Operation OVERT); and 3) The 12/25/09 plot by Umar 
Abdulmutallab to destroy Northwest Airlines Flight 253 by detonating explosives hidden in his 
undergarments.   
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B. EVALUATIVE CRITERIA AND POLICY ALTERNATIVES 
CONSIDERED 
Within the context of cost, legality, political acceptability, level of effort, and 
effectiveness, the following policy alternatives identified in Chapter I will now again be 
considered. Before that examination is begun in detail, however, note the Policy Options 
Matrix below from Chapter I. Additionally, as a review of the definitions assigned to the 
evaluative criterion at the beginning of this thesis, each element noted on the top 
horizontal line of the matrix is assigned the following meaning: 
• Cost—Refers to the monetary expense associated with implementing 
recommended changes. 
• Legality—Refers to the legal permissibility of state and federal statutes 
with regard to instituting recommended changes. 
• Political Acceptability—Relates to the acceptability of any proposed 
changes by local, state and federal legislative and executive bodies; also to 
the American public as a whole.  
• Level of Effort—The total amount of energy or exertion required by the 
managing body to implement any recommended changes.  
• Effectiveness—The total projected benefit to be yielded upon 
implementation of any proposed changes.  
Finally, the first vertical box on each line of the matrix denotes the expected result 
of each policy option considered. Consequently, after careful consideration of the 
research and anticipated results, the results yielded at the end of this research product 
reaffirm what was originally hypothesized in Chapter I.  
Table 4.   Policy Options Matrix 





1 Low Yes Poor Minimal Minimal 
2 Low to 
Med 
Yes Med Med Med 
3 Med to 
High 
Yes High Med to High High 
Immediately below are the original policy questions posed at the beginning of this 
thesis in Chapter I. These policy options are enumerated as 1, 2, and 3, and correspond to 
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the evaluative criteria in the Policy Options Matrix (Table 4). A detailed analysis and 
explanation of each policy option is undertaken in Subsection C of this chapter. Finally, 
also in Subsection C of this chapter, is a detailed explanation of the results recorded 
herein, which then leads to the Conclusion Chapter and the final recommendations. 
1. Improve the Dissemination Element of the Intelligence Cycle70 within 
the NAD 
Homeland security intelligence processes and dissemination procedures have 
improved since 9/11, but instituting federal policies and procedures to further refine the 
dissemination element of the intelligence cycle may help ensure a timelier, more regular, 
and detailed distribution of threat assessment information to aviation security operators. 
This option might include the selective sharing of classified details regarding emerging 
threats within the NAD, which may ultimately assist the local aviation security manager 
at Category X facilities in better understanding and responding to the overall threat 
picture within the aviation domain.  
To be clear, this option refers to the DHS-TSA Office of Intelligence and 
Analysis generating intelligence products, principally intelligence-based threat 
assessment products, for local aviation security managers on a more timely and consistent 
basis, which is a fundamental necessity currently not being accomplished by DHS-TSA. 
This could be accomplished, however, by the use of technology, such as secure video 
teleconferencing with local security partners, or through the use of incumbent field 
intelligence analysts already detailed to many TSA field offices around the nation. It does 
not necessarily require additional TSA intelligence personnel, but rather a more efficient 
dissemination of threat assessment information by some means. Conversely, this option 
may require local security operations to recruit intelligence analysts to interact with the 
DHS-TSA Office of Intelligence and Analysis personnel to receive information and 
properly analyze its meaning in a local context.       
                                                 
70 According to Johnson and Wirtz (2008), Intelligence and National Security: The Secret World of 
Spies, the U.S. intelligence cycle consists of five steps: planning and direction, collection, processing, 
analysis and production, and dissemination (p. 49).     
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2. Increase the Frequency of the TSA Threat Assessment Process 
Some improvements to the U.S. civil aviation security infrastructure have been 
realized since 9/11. For example, federalization of the screening workforce, 
standardization of the passenger/baggage screening processes and implementation of a 
broad-based triennial threat assessment of Category X airport facilities by TSA have all 
been incorporated within the NAD. But since large commercial aviation facilities are 
typically under a perpetual state of construction, reconfiguration, and expansion, a slight 
modification and improvement to the national aviation security posture may be realized if 
the triennial threat assessment currently mandated for Category X airports were required 
on an annual basis.  
For clarification, this option merely refers to TSA conducting the triennial threat 
assessment on an annual basis, which, as noted in this research project, is currently a one-
week review. This option does not propose to incorporate a more comprehensive threat 
assessment process, simply a more frequent one to account for the rapid changes in 
environmental conditions experienced at most Category X airport facilities.  
3. Institute an Intelligence-Driven, Risk-Based Security Doctrine 
Introduce federal legislation and or national policies to mandate the improved 
sharing and utilization of threat assessment information, along with the incorporation of a 
standardized risk-based management methodology,71 into all U.S. aviation security 
programs at Category X airports across the nation. This option would necessarily also 
include a mandate for each local aviation security operator to institute an appropriate 
organizational model to analyze and respond to threat assessment information against 
specific risk assessment and reduction criteria.  
Finally, this policy option incorporates much more than the small, incremental 
changes that may benefit U.S. aviation security in options one and two, above. In this 
                                                 
71 An appropriate risk assessment methodology (RAM) may include, but not be limited to: Sandia 
National Laboratories RAM for sector-specific plans: criticality, accessibility, recoverability, vulnerability, 
effect, and recognizability (CARVER) methodology; or mission, symbolism, history, accessibility, 
recognizability, population, and proximity (MSHARPP) methodology.   
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policy option, a suggestion is made to: 1) increase DHS-TSA’s sharing of threat 
assessment information with local partners in a more timely and consistent manner; 2) 
have DHS-TSA designate one specific risk-assessment methodology for use across the 
NAD; and 3) incorporate an adaptation of intelligence-led policing into the local aviation 
security domain that meshes elements policy options one and two together and into a 
comprehensive aviation security doctrine, which currently does not exist. This policy 
option suggests, as noted repeatedly throughout this research project, that intelligence-
based threat assessment information should lead, guide, and direct aviation security 
operations beyond the minimum baseline measures currently mandated by DHS-TSA. 
Finally, this policy option may require additional personnel at the local level as well as 
specific training in intelligence matters, which are details covered in the main text.          
C. POLICY OPTIONS ANALYSIS 
1. Improve the Dissemination Element of the Intelligence Cycle Within 
the NAD 
a. Lawfulness 
Writing on behalf of the President of the United States as well as the 
Director of National Intelligence, and citing Executive Orders 1233372 and 1347073 as 
the legal predicate for sharing threat assessment information at the state, local and tribal 
levels (SLT), Information Sharing Environment74 (ISE) Program Manager Thomas E. 
McNamara noted in his 2009 ISE Plans and Progress Annual Report to Congress that “. . 
. the essential role of SLT and private sector partners is fundamental to the ISE and is a 
                                                 
72 Executive Order 12333 “prescribes a uniform system for classifying, safeguarding, and 
declassifying information, including information relating to defense against transnational terrorism (White 
House, 2009).  
73 Executive Order 13470 amends and clarifies the President’s intent with regard to the United States’ 
intelligence activities, which prescribes, among other issues, the dissemination of threat assessment 
information (White House, 2008).  
74 Pursuant to Section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Act, in 2005 the President 
directed that an Information Sharing Program Manager be a part of the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence to ensure terrorism information is shared across federal, state and local governments (White 
House, 2005).  
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critical driver of information sharing in the homeland security and law enforcement 
communities” (p. 11).  Furthermore, again referencing amended Executive Order 12333, 
McNamara (2009) stated, “State, local and tribal governments are critical partners in 
securing and defending the United States from terrorism and other threats to the United 
States and its interests,” and that “our national intelligence efforts should take into 
account the responsibilities and requirements of State, local and tribal governments . . . 
when undertaking the collection and dissemination of information and intelligence to 
protect the United States” (p. 11).  As such, both the legal as well as the traditional “need 
to know” standards of receiving open source, sensitive, and classified intelligence 
products from the federal government are firmly established. Furthermore, as discussed 
in Chapter I of this thesis, both the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 
2004, as well as National Security Presidential Directive—47/Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 16’s Air Domain Surveillance and Intelligence Integration Plan 
establish the legal prerequisites necessary to share threat information with local aviation 
security managers. Accordingly, the legal threshold for sharing threat assessment 
information with local aviation security managers is not only permitted by the spirit and 
intent of current law and Presidential mandate, but is actually required.   
b. Effectiveness 
The potential effectiveness of sharing threat assessment information to 
better protect the NAD is good. Beyond providing the local aviation security operator 
with enhanced situational awareness, trend analysis, and risk appraisal capabilities, if 
threat assessment information were shared more openly and regularly by the federal 
government then pragmatic changes and supplements to any one particular airport 
security operator’s existing plans could be adjusted accordingly. Additionally, the 
intelligence-driven actions proactively enacted by local aviation operators could be 
monitored by TSA-HQ and replicated as a smart practice when and where appropriate at 
other Category X aviation facilities across the United States.  
Conversely, two problems may exist with this approach alone relative to 
effectiveness. First, this approach alone presupposes that local aviation security managers 
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are properly trained to analyze and interrupt intelligence information correctly. And 
second, assuming that a local security official is competently trained as an intelligence 
analyst, without the aid of a comprehensive risk-based analysis of their Category X 
facility the effective application of countermeasures may be marginalized. Consequently, 
while the approach of more widely disseminating threat assessment information at the 
local level would be better than the current limited state of dissemination across the 
NAD, the overall efficacy of establishing this measure alone would most likely be limited 
in scope.       
c. Political Acceptability 
Given the long history and support for better dissemination of threat 
assessment information across the NAD, particularly to local aviation security operators 
who as discussed in Chapter I of this thesis are in large part legally responsible for the 
security of Category X aviation facilities nationwide, the political acceptability of this 
measure would most likely be high. For example, the report produced by the 1989 
President’s Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism recommended sharing threat 
assessment information more widely at the local level, and that report was subsequently 
buttressed by the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation to do the same. Consequently, 
along with a plethora of federal legislation and Presidential executive orders mandating 
better intelligence sharing with state and local homeland security officials, the political 
acceptability and public support for such an act would probably be very significant. 
Indeed, it appears clear from this research project that the spirit and intent of both the 
executive and legislative branches of the United States government, and vicariously from 
the people of the United States, is that there is a high expectation that threat assessment 
information will be shared at all levels of government in order to better protect the 
country against future attacks.    
d. Level of Effort 
The level of effort required to better share threat assessment information 
across the NAD is estimated to require a medium level of exertion in its preliminary 
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stages of implementation. Placed into proper context, one should remember that the 
number of Category X aviation facilities in the United States numbers at a total of 27. As 
such, properly training and equipping approximately 10075 additional local intelligence 
analysts across the United States with the resources to properly and regularly interact 
with regional fusion centers, the TSA Office of Intelligence, the DHS Office of 
Intelligence, and the FBI would be minimal. This estimation of effort is also supported by 
the probability that technological resources such as secure telephones and secure internet 
connections to resources such as the FBI’s e-Guardian system and the Homeland Secure 
Data Network would be fairly inconsequential to acquire. However, a great deal of effort 
would probably exist to finally inculcate a custom and tradition within the intelligence 
and law enforcement communities that recognizes a vital need to share information with 
local aviation security mangers, thus requiring additional effort to break down the 
traditional lines of cultural demarcation and exclusion. Finally, the initial intelligence 
training for the local intelligence analysts may require a medium level of effort because 
all should receive an orientation and training DHS-TSA’s Office of Intelligence and 
Analysis to familiarize the new personnel with DHS-TSA’s policies, customs, and 
traditions regarding the aviation intelligence processes.     
e. Cost 
The relative costs, associated with better threat assessment information 
dissemination across the AND, are estimated to be low to medium in overall capital 
outlay and expenditures for travel and training. For example, since most Category X 
aviation facilities manage maintenance and operations budgets that require annual 
expenditures of hundreds of millions of dollars, the appropriation of funding for 
additional equipment, training and office space could most likely be managed with a 
modest to moderate increase to a Category X facility’s budget.   
                                                 
75 While the 100 is indeed an estimate of the total number of local intelligence analysts that would 
need to be recruited, hired and trained by local aviation authorities, it is an informed approximation. For 
example, a common staffing multiplier of 3.4 is oftentimes used to ensure that one person is on-duty 16-
hours per day, 365 days per year. As such, 3.4 x 27 = 91.8 individuals necessary for this task across the 
NAD’s 27 Category X airport facilities. As a consequence, this author simply rounded the number up to 
100.     
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2. Increase the Frequency of the TSA Risk Assessment Process 
a. Lawfulness 
The law with respect to conducting risk- and threat-based assessments at 
Category X aviation facilities in the United States is clearly mandated by current statute 
and executive decree. Specifically, this mandate is evidenced by a litany of federal 
directives aimed at this objective with, for example, Presidential Decision Directive 29 
(PDD-29). PDD-29 was signed by President Bill Clinton in 1994 and ordered various 
elements of the federal government to develop post-Cold War security policies and 
procedures relative to threat analysis and risk management in order to better protect the 
critical infrastructure of the United States. Likewise, in 2003 President George W. Bush 
enacted Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7), which directed federal 
agencies to identify, prioritize, and develop risk-based protective plans for all critical 
infrastructure sectors within the United States. The National Infrastructure Protection 
Plan and the Transportation Systems Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Sector-
Specific Plan for the Aviation Sector sprung from HSPD-7 and required, among other 
initiatives, to improve the security and resiliency of the NAD through the use of risk-
based threat assessments. As such, increasing the frequency of tri-annual TSA threat-
based assessments is not prohibited by either statute or executive declaration.  
b. Effectiveness 
The potential effectiveness of increasing the frequency of TSA risk-based 
assessments is judged as low, which is due to several reasons. First, the scope of the 
current tri-annual assessment is severely limited as most evaluations are conducted within 
a one-week timeframe, which is hardly long enough to conduct a comprehensive 
assessment of a sprawling Category X aviation facility. Second, the current TSA 
assessment process fails to include either a comprehensive assessment of the current 
protective measures and procedures utilized at an assessed commercial aviation facility, 
or any type of comprehensive engineering study to determine the critical components 
associated with the facility (e.g., major electrical and water supply sources), or any type 
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of engineering study to calculate the structural resiliency of critical buildings, 
aeronautical navigational aids, etc. from a potential bomb blast. Third, the current 
assessment process utilized by TSA fails to include the local operator’s input in any 
meaningful way, save and except the typical in-brief and out-brief after the week’s 
assessment has been completed. Fourth, since most Category X aviation facilities are in a 
constant state of construction and physical reconfiguration, increasing the assessment 
process to even an annual basis would be of little assistance because of the rapid growth 
and change that most facilities experience on a continuous basis. As such, the viability or 
relative usefulness of such a work product is marginal in the first place, and simply 
increasing the frequency of such an assessment process would most likely continue to 
yield a product of questionable utility.  
c. Political Acceptability 
The political acceptability of increasing the frequency of the current TSA 
risk assessment process is judged as poor. While initially the measure may garner some 
support with both the public and the elected representatives evaluating such a measure, if 
and when it was revealed that the current TSA assessment process lacked in both breadth 
and depth (that it still a non-comprehensive, high-level, one-week review of a very large 
critical infrastructure site), then both a public and political backlash could result. 
Furthermore, as noted above, the relative usefulness of simply replicating an already sub-
standard assessment process more frequently would most likely be viewed as a waste of 
time and taxpayer monies, thus adding to the popular public outcry of “airport security 
theater.”76 
d. Level of Effort 
The level of effort to achieve an increased TSA risk assessment frequency 
is judged to be minimal. Since TSA assessment teams are fairly small, requiring only 
three to four personnel in total, then deploying these teams on a more frequent basis to 
                                                 
76 The phrase “airport security theater” is defined by CNN commentator Bruce Schneier as “measures 
that make people feel more secure without doing anything to actually improve their security” (Schneier, 
2009).  
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the nation’s 27 Category X aviation facilities represents a fairly inconsequential burden 
for the federal government. Furthermore, unless the risk assessment process was altered 
to become more substantive or comprehensive in nature, then the time expended at any 
given commercial aviation facility would not be altered beyond the current timeframe of 
one-week.    
e. Cost 
The cost for increasing the frequency of the current TSA risk assessment 
process is judged to be low to medium. The rationale for this estimation is predicated 
upon the fact that only personnel costs associated with salaries and travel expenses would 
be impacted by deploying TSA risk assessment teams around the nation on a more 
frequent basis. As such, dependent upon whether or not TSA chose to increase staffing 
numbers to facilitate a more frequent assessment schedule, only travel expenses for 
incumbent personnel would affect the current cost burden associated with this process.  
3. Institute an Intelligence-Driven, Risk-Based Security Doctrine 
a. Lawfulness 
With respect to both intelligence dissemination/use and the 
implementation of a specific risk-based assessment methodology within the NAD at the 
local level, the legality of instituting an intelligence-driven, risk-based security doctrine 
within the U.S. aeronautical domain is a legally viable option. Incorporated by reference 
herein, the rationale heretofore cited in sections 1(a) and 2 (a) of this chapter are also 
included herein as the legal foundation for which such measures may be instituted. 
Additionally, however, in order to ensure consistency and uniformity throughout the 
NAD in effectuating an intelligence-driven, risk-based aviation security doctrine, the 
legal authority to even mandate such measures are also found in Title 49 CFR § 1502.1.77 
                                                 
77 Title 49 CFR § 1502.1 defines the responsibilities and authority delegated to the administrator of 
TSA by the U.S. Congress and the President of the United States. This statute lists, among other 
responsibilities, the designated administrator’s duty to plan, direct and control the TSA as well as ensure 
security in all modes of transportation.   
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Accordingly, there are no legal barriers for the TSA to: 1) begin to share threat 
assessment information more regularly with local security partners within the NAD; or 2) 
designate a specific risk-based assessment model for use in the aviation domain.  
b. Effectiveness 
The projected benefits from instituting an intelligence-led, risk-based 
security model within the aviation domain are judged to be high. The basis for this 
conclusion is predicated upon the notion that if threat assessment information were 
shared more consistently with local security operators then pragmatic changes and 
supplements to any one particular airport’s security plan may be augmented based upon 
that facility’s risk-based assessment of strengths and contingent weaknesses. Once 
identified, vulnerabilities could then be addressed with a tailored approach at each of the 
nation’s airports dependent upon the unique physical, environmental, financial, and 
human resources available to each facility. The inevitable differences in the type, amount 
and frequency of the countermeasures deployed at each airport would then result in a 
more random and unpredictable threat mitigation strategy, thus forcing adversaries to 
either abandon a particular plan or otherwise expend appreciably more time and resources 
conducting preoperational surveillance.78 Finally, the effectiveness of this particular 
approach would be realized by moving beyond the standard baseline, or minimum, 
measures typically required by TSA-HQ, and would also facilitate creativity and 
collaboration at both the local and federal levels of government.  
4. Political Acceptability 
The political acceptability for adopting an intelligence-led, risk-based security 
strategy across the NAD is judged to be high. The foundation for this judgment is 
supported by the statutory requirements related to intelligence sharing and risk-based  
 
 
                                                 
78 The effective utilization of available resources to thwart potential attacks is related to, and 
consistent with, the stated security philosophy of detecting, deterring, delaying, and denying adversaries to 
the NAD.   
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threat and vulnerability assessments already discussed in this chapter and incorporated 
herein by reference. Additionally, however, this concept is also supported by the 
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.  
For example, Chapter 12.4 of the 9/11 Commission Report recommends that 
federal, state and local governments develop “a layered security system” across the U.S. 
aviation infrastructure “that [is] redundant and coordinated” (pp. 391–392). Moreover, 
the protective layers instituted must be deployed based upon a plan to identify and 
“improve weak individual layers and the effectiveness of the layered systems” deployed 
(9/11 Commission Report, 2004, p. 392). Likewise, the 9/11 Commission Report in 
Chapter 13.3 details the fact that federal, state and local entities should organize 
themselves in order to achieve “unity of effort” in information sharing, recognizing that 
the Cold War standard of sharing intelligence based upon a “need to know” standard 
should evolve into a culture of “need to share” (p. 417).    
a. Level of Effort 
The level of effort required to institute a two-pronged approach of 
intelligence-led, risk-based aviation security is judged to be medium to high. This is 
assessment is based upon principal two factors: 1) the TSA will have to identify and 
mandate the use of one particular risk-based assessment model to be utilized within the 
aviation domain, a decision-making process that will inevitably provoke much discussion 
and debate between the aviation industry and federal government; and 2) while providing 
the appropriate technologies and developing adequate procedures for changing culture 
with respect to intelligence sharing may be moderate, the larger challenge will be 
changing the culture within the intelligence community to recognize their responsibility 
to share information more readily. However, the level of effort necessary to effect these 
changes may be mitigated somewhat by again recognizing the relatively small population 
of 27 Category X airport security managers across the nation that would have to folded 
into this proposed change. 
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b. Cost 
The cost to incorporate an intelligence-led, risk based security model into 
the NAD at all Category X airport facilities is estimated to be medium to high. This 
estimate takes into account the funding necessary to purchase a comprehensive, 
technology-driven, risk-based assessment program for all Category X airport facilities in 
the United States, as well as associated technologies for secure communications 
equipment, security clearances and appropriate training for local security personnel. 
Additionally, as discussed in Policy Option 1, approximately 100 local intelligence 
analysts would have to recruited, hired, and trained for this model (see Policy Option 1 
for details relative to staffing and training). Considered it its totality, however, the 
relative cost borne from instituting an intelligence-led, risk-based security model, and 
actually creating a defined aviation security doctrine into the NAD, may be insignificant 
if compared to the potential of the U.S. sustaining another preventable attack within the 
air domain—preventable, perhaps, by the institution of this policy option.  
D. CONCLUSION 
If you know the enemy and know yourself you need not fear the results of 
a hundred battles. (Sun Tzu, c. 6th century B.C.)  
Centuries ago, the ancient Chinese General Sun Tzu wisely cautioned those 
engaged in conflict to know themselves as well as their adversaries in order to ensure 
long-term success. While those involved in today’s struggle to defend the National 
Aeronautical System against terrorism are certainly not operating on an active battlefield 
in a traditional sense, the sage advice imparted long ago remains relevant for modern day 
security managers nonetheless. Specifically, public safety officials must know and 
understand what needs to be protected—as well as its relative strengths and 
weaknesses—and at the same time also know and understand the likely tactics, 
techniques and procedures that adversaries may use to again attack the United States by 
exploiting the weaknesses within the national air transportation system.        
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To this end, this chapter examined three alternatives that may provide an 
enhanced level of protection for commercial use aviation facilities across the United 
States under a methodology utilizing key elements of public policy decision-making. As 
such, only Option 3, Instituting an Intelligence-driven, Risk-based Security Doctrine, 
accomplishes a more practicable, holistic approach of improving both aspects of a viable 
aviation security program through: 1) the acquisition and proactive deployment of 
resources against pre-identified contingent risks/weaknesses as suggested by a 
comprehensive risk assessment methodology; and 2) the effective and efficient utilization 
of those protective resources as suggested by threat assessment information. Accordingly, 
a comprehensive risk appraisal program used in conjunction with threat assessment 
information will best serve to bolster the overall aviation security posture of the NAD, 
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VIII. LIMITATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSION 
Men never do evil so completely and cheerfully as when they do it from 
religious conviction.  Blaise Pascal (1623–1662) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Blaise Pascal’s historic quotation is as true today as it was over 300 years ago: 
religion may sometimes be used as a pretextual justification for brutal and violent 
behavior. Indeed, in today’s society, the threats against the United States are, to a very 
large and very real extent, deeply associated with religious extremism. Evidence of this 
fact was horribly manifested on September 11, 2001, when 2,974 (Alfano, 2006) innocent 
people were murdered on our nation’s east coast in the name of religion. On that dreadful 
day, 19 hijackers79 from a radical Islamic organization known as al-Qaeda80 exploited the 
free and open principles that form the foundation of this country’s existence and 
converted commercial airliners into weapons of mass destruction. This attack sparked the 
nation’s Global War on Terror (GWOT) and subsequently resulted in the deployment of 
U.S. military and law enforcement resources around the globe—to distant places like 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan. But, despite all that has been done to better secure the 
United States since 9/11, the threat to the U.S. homeland and commercial aviation 
continues to this day and may endure as such for three to four more generations.  
Consequently, ensuring the adequate defense of the National Aeronautical Domain is 
vital to the physical, psychological, and economic security interests of the United States.  
With the unrelenting problem of aviation-based terrorism acutely recognized 
throughout this thesis, and while this research project offers many pragmatic solutions to 
the U.S. aviation security quandary, it does not, in any way, purport to address all of the 
problems and remedies necessary to render the United States completely safe within the 
                                                 
79 All 19 hijackers were Islamic extremists. In fact, the hijackers involved were chosen because they 
were “young mujahideen” (9/11 Commission, 2004, p. 234). 
80 The al-Qaeda terrorist group is the widely acknowledged and self-proclaimed organization 
responsible for the September 11, 2001 hijackings of commercial aircraft and murder of 2,974 individuals.  
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national air transportation network. To be certain, this research is necessarily limited in 
scope in order to focus on three key issues within the National Aeronautical Domain, 
namely: 1) intelligence sharing; 2) risk management and associated methodologies; and 
3) the interrelated concept of intelligence-led policing in order to fuse the key issues of 
one and two together in some structured and consistent manner, at all levels of 
government, across the United States.     
B. LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH 
While this thesis attempts to identify the most critical elements of a more 
effective aviation security program to better protect this nation and its people, it 
admittedly does not delve into the complicated and admittedly difficult tasks of actually 
designing and implementing the intelligence-led, risk-based methodology that is 
ultimately recommended herein. To be sure, the subject of implementation in simply 
beyond the scope of this research product. In fact, in the end, this thesis prompts more 
questions than it answers with respect to both policy implication and field 
implementation. For example, the following questions arise with regard to actually 
instituting an intelligence-led, risk-based aviation security doctrine, to wit: 
• How does one induce DHS to research and adopt a specific risk 
assessment methodology for all Category X airport facilities in the United 
States?  
• How does one persuade the U.S. intelligence community to begin sharing 
more intelligence-based threat assessment information across the 
intelligence enterprise?  
• How does one persuade DHS to begin sharing more intelligence-based 
threat assessment information with local aviation security managers 
nationwide?  
• How should an adaptation of the intelligence-led policing methodology 
actually be introduced into the air domain? 
• How may individual airport authorities across the NAD contribute to the 
collection efforts of the USIC?  
• Will DHS-TSA sponsor the security clearances of all 27 Category X 
airport security operators in the United States in order to enhance 
situational awareness of threats within the domain? 
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• Beyond Category X aviation facilities, at what point should the 
recommendations contained in this thesis be implemented throughout the 
entire U.S. aviation infrastructure, particularly at Category I facilities in 
the United States?   
• What technology is necessary to facilitate an intelligence-led, risk based 
process across the nation?  
• Which types of training would be necessary for local aviation security 
operators to effectively implement an intelligence-led, risk-based 
methodology? 
• How and to what extent may the international security perspectives 
documented in this thesis be incorporated into the intelligence-led, risk-
based methodology referenced herein?     
• How and to what extent does the flying public need to be brought into the 
homeland security megacommunity that is referenced herein? 
• Should either DHS security funding or federal legislation be tied to the 
mandatory implementation of an intelligence-led, risk-based methodology 
for all U.S. Category X airports in order to ensure uniformity of process, 
or application of doctrine? 
• Akin to the U.S. Navy’s Naval Doctrine Publication 2: Naval Intelligence, 
should DHS develop a similar doctrine for U.S. aviation intelligence 
activities in order to articulate civil aviation intelligence doctrine and 
provide the foundation for the development of tactics, techniques and 
procedures within the National Aeronautical Domain?     
C. DISCUSSION 
The fact that the civil air domain is a critical component of the U.S. and 
international aviation infrastructure is a truth well known to our nation’s adversaries. In 
fact, worldwide this reality is demonstrated in the following chronology of 
attacks/attempted attacks on international commercial aviation assets since 2001:   
• September 11, 2001 attacks, United States 
• Russian aircraft attacks, Russia 
• Al-Qaeda aviation plot on London’s Canary Wharf District, United 
Kingdom  
• Richard Reid attack (shoe bomber), United Kingdom 
• Los Angeles airport plot, United States 
• Liquid explosives plot (Operation OVERT), United Kingdom 
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• JFK airport plot, United States 
• Glasgow airport attack, Scotland 
• December 25, 2009 aircraft attack, United States 
• October 29, 2010 cargo aircraft plot, Yemen/Dubai/United Kingdom 
Indeed, it is the recurring persistence of aviation-related terrorist attacks that, in 
large part, precipitated the U.S. Congress’ hearings into these matters in September 2010.     
In his written testimony presented to the Full Committee of the U.S. House of 
Representative’s Homeland Security Committee on September 15, 2010, in a hearing 
entitled The Evolving Nature of Terrorism: Nine Years after the 9/11 Attacks, Mr. Peter 
Bergen, Co-Director of the New America Foundation’s Counterterrorism Strategy 
Initiative, posits: “What kinds of future targets or tactics might jihadist groups attack or 
use?” Without much surprise, Bergen’s number one response to Congress was: 
“Attacking commercial aviation—the central nervous system of the global economy 
[emphasis added]—continues to preoccupy al-Qaeda” (Bergen, 2010). Similarly, also 
providing written testimony before the same Congressional committee, Dr. Bruce 
Hoffman, Director of the Security Studies Program and a tenured professor at 
Georgetown University, commented, “Today, America faces a dynamic threat that has 
diversified to a broad array of attacks, from shootings to car bombs to simultaneous 
suicide attacks to attempted in-flight bombings of passenger aircraft [emphasis added]” 
(Hoffman, 2010). And so, according to these two leading experts in international 
terrorism, the future challenges facing the national security of the United States generally, 
and the security of the commercial aviation industry specifically, remain significant. 
Sadly, however, as pointed out in both Bergman’s and Hoffman’s testimony, this fact is 
true even nine years after the 9/11 attacks—a tragedy of the magnitude that proved to be 
one of those milepost events in the history of the world.  
It is against this backdrop of calamity that the inherent and persistent issues 
relative to the security of the National Aeronautical Domain were identified and 
examined in this thesis with the intent to somehow stimulate thought and offer real-world 
possibilities with respect to potential improvements that both the federal and local 
elements of governments engaged in protecting America’s air transportation network 
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could implement. This has been accomplished in this research by revealing that an 
effective partnership, or true collaboration, between our federal and local governments, in 
conjunction with the flying public, is actually necessary in order to better protect 
commercial aviation operations in the United States. Once a real partnership is 
established—one that is predicated upon real trust and partnership—then both the local 
and federal governments may work together to address the specific areas related to 
aviation security that need to be improved.  In fact, borrowing from the “security 
megacommunity” theme already discussed in Chapter VI of this thesis, the pragmatic, 
real-world improvements noted hereinabove will not possess a viable opportunity for 
implementation unless collaboration, communication, and cooperation is first established 
between the federal and local entities responsible for execution of policy in the field. This 
statement should not be extrapolated to infer that such relationships do not already exist 
in certain instances; but to be certain, they must exist at all U.S. aviation facilities if the 
full benefit of these recommendations are to be realized across the entire U.S. aviation 
network.         
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
With respect to the substantive issues relative to security improvements within the 
U.S. aviation community, this thesis argues, for example, that:  
• The federal government must do more to ensure, once and for all, that 
intelligence-based threat assessment information is shared with local 
aviation security counterparts on a more regular and comprehensive basis. 
This simply is not occurring with any consistency at the time of this 
writing (November 2010). This recommendation is drawn from the 
cumulative analysis conducted in Chapter VII of this thesis, particularly 
with regard to the evaluative criteria identified in the Policy Options 
Matrix data developed vis-à-vis Policy Option 1, to wit: “Improve the 
Dissemination Element of the Intelligence Cycle within the NAD.”81 
• The federal government must identify and mandate a specific risk-based 
assessment methodology for local Category X airport operators in the 
United States. Ironically, although risk assessments are mandated in 
number of federal guidance documents cited throughout this thesis, risk 
                                                 
81 See, for example, Chapters I, II and III of this thesis for a detailed discussion regarding this 
recommendation. 
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assessment methodologies are neither consistent, nor timely, nor typically 
comprehensive (if completed at all on the local level) throughout the 
aviation industry. This recommendation is predicated upon the cumulative 
analysis of this thesis project as demonstrated in Chapter VII, particularly 
with regard to the evaluative criteria established in the Policy Options 
Matrix’s overall data developed vis-à-vis Policy Option 2, to wit: 
“Increase the Frequency of the TSA Threat Assessment Process.” In this 
particular segment of the thesis, the original hypothesis of merely 
increasing the frequency of the current TSA process was not only 
discerned to be both superficial and too infrequent, it was also determined 
that no specific, comprehensive risk-based methodology is currently being 
utilized that could be replicated by both the TSA as well as airport 
operators across the United States.82  
• Local governments that own and operate commercial airport facilities 
must shed the mindset that the mere enactment of TSA-mandated baseline 
measures alone are adequate in the overall defense of the national air 
transportation network. Local units of government must endeavor to do 
more to enhance aviation security throughout the U.S. aviation network, in 
conjunction with the federal government, to be certain, but at times must 
be prepared to lead the way in a reasonable, prudent and responsible 
manner. This is particularly true with respect to conducting comprehensive 
risk assessments at the nation’s commercial aviation facilities. This 
recommendation emanates from Chapter VII’s Policy Options Matrix and 
the Policy Option 2 hypothesis, which is noted immediately above at 
recommendation two. Additionally, however, as noted in Chapter II of this 
research product, federally-regulated Category X airport facility operators 
possess a legal responsibility to ensure the security of their respective 
facilities. As such, if the current actions of the federal government are 
deemed insufficient—and this research respectfully draws that 
conclusion—then local authorities alone should better ensure public safety 
by addressing this important issue.83  
• An active and ongoing partnership between all levels of government and 
the flying public must be achieved in order to substantively improve the 
security posture of the National Air Domain. Presently there are no 
meaningful programs known to this thesis’ author/aviation security 
practitioner that really endeavor to coalesce representatives of 
government, private business, and the citizenry together in pursuit of 
heightened aviation security objectives—beyond the “if you see something 
say something” slogan. This recommendation is drawn from the 
                                                 
82 See, for example, Chapters I and IV of this thesis for a detailed discussion regarding this 
recommendation.  
83 See, for example, Chapters I, II, and IV of this thesis for a detailed discussion regarding this 
recommendation.  
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discussion in Chapter VI of this thesis wherein the absolute need for 
collaboration and true partnership within all levels of government, the 
private sector, and citizens is undertaken in the concept of developing an 
aviation security megacommunity. This recommendation is also the result 
of the evaluative criteria established in the Policy Options Matrix data 
developed vis-à-vis Policy Option 3, to wit: “Institute an Intelligence-
driven, Risk-based Security Doctrine.” 84  
• In order to achieve these goals, an adaptation of an intelligence-led 
policing model must be incorporated within the aviation sector’s Category 
X airport security organizations, a policing/ homeland security concept 
that the federal government should endorse—and somehow induce—
across the entire security enterprise of the U.S. aviation domain. The 
foundation of this recommendation is centered upon the cumulative 
analysis conducted in Chapter VII of this thesis, particularly with regard to 
the evaluative criteria established in the Policy Options Matrix data 
assimilated for Policy Option 3, to wit: “Institute an Intelligence-driven, 
Risk-based Security Doctrine.” As reflected in the aforementioned data 
and rationale, this particular element of the various recommendations cited 
herein is absolutely critical because it meshes together the intelligence 
process, the risk assessment/management process, as well as the 
organizational culture within which to create a successful aviation security 
environment. 85And finally,  
• The foreign aviation security services of Israel, Australia, and the United 
Kingdom should be extensively reviewed because, as evidenced in 
Chapter V of this thesis, it appears that many of the problems relative to 
intelligence sharing, risk assessment/mitigation, and interagency security 
service collaboration within the aviation domain have already been 
successfully addressed and resolved. This recommendation is predicated 
upon the comprehensive discussion undertaken in Chapter V of this 
research product wherein the referenced nations have already addressed 
the issues regarding U.S. aviation security brought to light herein. 
Additionally, however, this recommendation is based upon the cumulative 
analysis of the evaluative criteria established for all three policy options 
heretofore identified.86      
                                                 
84 See, for example, Chapters V, VI, and VII of this thesis for a detailed discussion regarding this 
recommendation.  
85 See, for example, Chapters VI and VII of this thesis for a detailed discussion regarding this 
recommendation.  
86 See, for example, Chapters V and VII of this thesis for a detailed discussion regarding this 
recommendation.  
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E. ESTIMATING THE OUTCOMES 
This section will consider the estimated outcomes of instituting an intelligence-led 
policing strategy within the National Aeronautical Domain to: 1) utilize intelligence-
based threat assessment information to, 2) merge intelligence information with the threat 
assessment process to develop a more accurate overall threat picture to then, 3) drive the 
development of policies and the deployment of physical resources to better protect any 
given Category X aviation facility. Included in this section as well is the projected benefit 
of creating a networked aviation security megacommunity (composed of non-traditional 
security members such as ticket/gate/ramp agents, citizens, etc.) to aid and support the 
aviation security enterprise.  
In Blue Ocean Strategy, Kim and Mauborgne (2005) discuss using a strategy 
canvass as “both a diagnostic and an action framework for building a compelling” plan to 
address a problem, such as to understand market variables of a particular industry, or to 
implement a program where many factors must be considered (p. 25). In assessing the 
recommendations made in this thesis, those interested in improving the U.S. aviation 
security enterprise possess a responsibility to understand the various elements extant 
within the environment as they currently exist, as well as understand the likely outcome 
of those same elements once they have been addressed by the policy options proposed 
herein. The strategy canvass developed to evaluate this research product is described 
herein below.            
Represented graphically, the following Eliminate-Reduce-Raise-Create Grid (E-
R2-C Grid) (Figure 6) depicts the essential elements necessary in creating an aviation 
security megacommunity by use of an intelligence-led policing model.  This grid was 
developed by asking by asking four essential questions necessary to effect change, such 
as:  
• What needs to be eliminated?  
• What needs to be raised? 
• What needs to be reduced?  
• What needs to be created?  
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With this information answered, a strategy canvas was then created to convey the 
current state of the U.S. aviation security program, as well as the subsequent intent and 
expectation, or effect, that the policy options, identified in Chapter VII of this thesis, are 
expected to yield. In the example shown below, the horizontal axis lists nine elements 
deemed essential for implementing an improved national aviation security program. 
Those elements are: 
• TSA Regulatory Compliance = comportment to federal baseline, or 
minimum, security mandates. 
• Standard Response Protocols = common industry practices regarding 
reactive issues such as responses to access control breaches, etc. 
• Communications = within and across all of the agencies comprising the 
local security enterprise. 
• Community Outreach = the level to which the security enterprise 
interacts and solicits input from both non-traditional members as well as 
traditional members within the aviation community.  
• Dynamic Budgeting = the relative flexibility regarding financial matters 
that both the federal and local governments possess in responding to 
unexpected security appropriations within a budget cycle.   
• Security Awareness = the relative level of consciousness and 
responsiveness that individuals within the aviation community as a whole 
possess toward aviation security.  
• Risk-based Assessments = the degree to which, if any, comprehensive 
risk-based security assessments are conducted at U.S. Category X aviation 
facilities. 
• Intelligence Sharing = the degree to which, if any, that intelligence-based 
threat assessment information is shared with local security counterparts to 
influence security policy and field operations. 
• Security Community = the level to which a sense of responsibility and 
accountability exists within the aviation environment to ensure or improve 
security standards. 
The vertical axis of the strategy canvass depicts the relative degree to which—
from high to low—each listed essential element supports the critical components listed 
above. The process for rating and plotting each essential element was predicated upon 
intuition as developed by this research, empirical evidence, and other professional law 
enforcement experience.     
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In the strategy canvass (Figure 6) listing the relevant elements of an effective 
aviation security program, this author estimates the current state of U.S. aviation security 
in red boxes. On the same high to low scale, this author utilizes blue triangles to estimate 
the expected state of overall improvement if an intelligent-led policing model is 
implemented within the air domain security enterprise. Of particular importance, the 
value proposition elements identify the general areas of aviation security that must be 
focused upon, and the three value innovation elements identified are those principal 
factors examined and deemed most important in this thesis. A score of high indicates the 
estimated efficacy of each critical element listed.  
While all of the factors cited for improving the U.S. aviation security environment 
are estimated to be positively influenced by the recommendations made herein, particular 
attention should be given to risk-based assessments, intelligence sharing and the creation 
of a security community, all of which are judged to be significantly improved by the 
incorporation of the recommendations made herein. In fact, in reviewing this strategy 
canvass in detail, note that the most critical elements listed under the Value Proposition 
section are not rated as indicated by the red boxes. This is because these elements do not 
currently exist in any real, organized, and discernable degree within the NAD at this time. 
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Figure 6.   A Strategy Canvass for Improving U.S. Aviation Security  
 
 114
F. CONCLUSION AND PROPOSAL 
In conclusion, since the scope of this research is admittedly limited with respect to 
implementation, the creation of a multi-agency aviation security working group is 
proposed. This group should be formed by DHS to further evaluate the viability of the 
recommendations made herein and report the findings to the: 
• Secretary of Homeland Security  
• Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration 
• Attorney General  
• Director of the FBI 
• National Security Advisor 
• Chairman, U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland 
Security    
The composition of this working group should include representatives from the 
following federal and local agencies, as well as the private sector, and should be co-
chaired by representatives from both the federal and local levels of government. Since the 
utility of the security cooperation model outlined in this thesis may also benefit other 
entities within the U.S.—mass transit, maritime, and freight transportation industries—
consideration should also be given to include members from of those critical 
infrastructure sectors as well.  
The composition of this working group should include, at a minimum, security 
representatives from the following organizations: 
• DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis 
• DHS Office of National Protection and Programs Directorate 
• DHS-TSA Office of Intelligence 
• DHS-TSA Office of Transportation Threat Assessment and Credentialing 
• DHS-TSA Office of Security Operations 
• The Federal Bureau of Investigation 
• The National Counterterrorism Center  
• Airports Council International—North America 
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• American Association of Airport Executives 
• Airport Law Enforcement Agencies Network 
• The Airport Security Coordinator from a U.S. Category X Airport 
• The International Air Transport Association  
In addition to the questions posed in subsection B of this chapter, the following 
three overarching subject areas, which collectively form the foundation of this entire 
research product, should be addressed initially by the interagency working group 
proposed herein:  
1. Intelligence Collection and Sharing 
• Specifically which type(s) of intelligence products should be shared with 
local aviation security practitioners? 
• How often should intelligence products be shared with local counterparts? 
• Who will disseminate intelligence-based threat assessment products to 
whom? 
• What information exists that is not currently being collected by local 
airport authorities that should be forwarded to the USIC?  
• What level of federal security clearance, if any, will be necessary for local 
aviation security practitioners in order to implement this process? 
• What type of information not currently provided by airport authorities 
could be produced and passed forward to the USIC? 
• What type of training will be necessary for both local as well as federal 
aviation security counterparts across the nation involved in the intelligence 
collection and dissemination processes? 
• What is the relative cost of such an initiative in terms of training and 
infrastructure development?  
• Who will bear the costs for implementing and sustaining this aspect of the 
program?  
2. Risk Assessment Methodology 
• Specifically which risk assessment methodology should be selected for the 
National Aeronautical Domain?  
• Once selected, who will conduct comprehensive risk assessments at each 
of the nation’s Category X airport facilities? 
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• What type of training will be necessary to ensure that a minimum level of 
competency and consistency will be achieved once a specific risk 
assessment methodology is chosen? 
• How often should a comprehensive risk assessment be updated at the 
nation’s Category X airport facilities?   
• What are the relative costs for conducting comprehensive risk assessment 
at the nation’s Category X airport facilities?  
• Who will bear the cost for implementing and sustaining this aspect of the 
program?     
3. Introduction of an Intelligence-Led Policing Construct Throughout 
the NAD to Conjoin the Intelligence and Risk 
Assessment/Management Processes  
• What is the definition of intelligence-led policing as it applies to the 
National Aeronautical Domain?  
• Should the idea of intelligence-led policing with the civil aviation 
environment be re-named “intelligence-led aviation security”? 
• Will the newly defined adaptation of intelligence-led policing be 
considered the risk management methodology that must be used 
consistently throughout the National Aeronautical Domain in order merge 
the subject areas of intelligence and risk assessment together? 
• What type of training will be necessary for both local as well as federal 
partners who are engaged in the process of instituting intelligence-led 
policing throughout the National Aeronautical Domain? 
• What are the relative costs associated with inculcating and sustaining an 
intelligence-led policing process throughout the National Aviation 
Domain?  
• What are the cultural barriers that will have to be overcome to effectively 
institute intelligence-led policing throughout the National Aeronautical 
Domain? 
• Should the federal government mandate the implementation of a form of 
intelligence-led policing to ensure the relative efficacy of security 
countermeasures deployed across the National Aeronautical Domain?     
• In order to create a security megacommunity as discussed in this thesis, 
how may passengers and other citizens involved in the aviation industry 
participate and otherwise add value to the process of aviation-specific 
intelligence-led policing? 
• Should one or two of the nation’s Category X airport facilities be chosen 
to field test the concept of merging intelligence-based threat assessment 
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information with a specific comprehensive risk assessment 
methodology—through and by use of an intelligence-led policing 
organizational structure?  
In summary, as the conclusion to this thesis is being written, the inveterate threats 
posed to the United States through the vulnerabilities of the National Aeronautical 
Domain remain starkly obvious as once again evidenced by the October 29, 2010 
aviation-borne parcel bomb plot sponsored by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. This 
somber reminder that a creative and committed enemy is seeking to attack the civilian 
population of this country by the exploitation of civil aviation assets should encourage 
the leaders of the United States government to immediately consider, and act upon, the 
common sense policy recommendations contained in this thesis. This call-to-action is 
particularly relevant now since history reminds us that post-incident counterterrorism 
policy is oftentimes made in haste—is fraught with the collective emotions of a grieving 
nation—and as a consequence oftentimes yield poor results. Acting upon the policy 
recommendations in this thesis now with calm certitude, however, will allow us to better 
protect ourselves as a people and as a nation, and, most importantly, as a society that 
recognizes and values the supremacy of the rule of law as dictated by that most sacred 
document we know as the Constitution of the United States of America.            
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